What Europe Can Do Now

The Problem with European Strategy Papers

Europe produces strategy papers at industrial scale. Strategic autonomy. Digital sovereignty. Strategic Compass. European Defence Union. The documents are often precise, sometimes brilliant — and almost always without consequence. Not because the diagnoses are wrong, but because a chasm lies between diagnosis and action that nobody is prepared to cross: the consensus of all 27 member states, agreement on priorities, the political courage to use instruments that trigger uncomfortable reactions.

This essay is not a strategy paper. It is a list of actions — concrete, implementable, without unanimity, without new treaties, without new institutions. Each of the eight measures can be realised with existing majorities in the EU Council or as a NATO Council decision. None requires Hungary's agreement. None requires the Commission President to develop a vision. They require only that a sufficient number of European governments decides to use the tools already in hand.

The tools exist. What is missing is the will to use them.

I. Immediately — within months

1. Declare Galileo mandatory infrastructure

The European satellite navigation system Galileo has been fully operational since 2016. It is already integrated as a backup in many devices. But most European critical systems — banks, power grids, mobile phone masts, military — use GPS as their primary time synchronisation system. GPS is a US military system that can theoretically be switched off regionally. The legal basis for such a decision is not public.

An EU regulation suffices: all operators of critical infrastructure in the EU use Galileo as the primary system, GPS as backup. This is not a technical revolution — it is a design decision that can be implemented in every next update cycle. Timeline: 18 months for the regulation, 36 months for full implementation. Cost: marginal. Strategic effect: Europe becomes independent of a foreign military system for its own critical infrastructure.

2. Give the Blocking Statute real teeth

In 2014, BNP Paribas paid 8.9 billion dollars in fines to the US Justice Department — for transactions that were entirely legal under European law. The EU Blocking Statute of 1996 theoretically prohibits European companies from complying with such US extraterritoriality claims. In practice it is ineffective: it prohibits compliance but does not protect against the US sanctions that non-compliance triggers.

The reform is clear: a European compensation fund for companies that pay US penalties because they complied with European law. And a liability obligation for companies that circumvent European law under US pressure. This reverses the calculation: no longer the question of whether to comply with US law or EU law — but the certainty that the costs of disloyalty to European law are at least as high as the costs of US penalties. This is a legislative measure. It needs no new institutions — only political will in the European Parliament and the Council.

3. Design the digital euro as a wholesale instrument

The European Central Bank is currently developing the digital euro — as a consumer instrument. Citizens should be able to pay with it like cash. That is useful, but it is not what Europe strategically needs.

What Europe needs is a digital euro that also functions as a wholesale settlement system: for foreign trade finance between companies, for clearing between central banks, for commodity transactions currently denominated in dollars. The architecture of the digital euro is being fixed this year. If no political directive comes now to include the wholesale mandate, it will take ten years to retrofit. This is not a budget decision — it is a design decision. It must be taken now.

4. Give the NATO Hybrid Fusion Cell a public mandate

The NATO Hybrid Fusion Cell exists. It collects intelligence on hybrid operations against NATO members. What it does not have is a mandate for public communication. The 34 documented Russian sabotage attacks in Europe in 2024 are known — internally. Publicly they are communicated in fragmented, delayed and uncoordinated fashion.

A public hybrid register — daily updated, with defined attribution criteria, readable by anyone — changes the political dynamic fundamentally. When citizens know that the counter of Russian hybrid operations this month stands at twenty, the political cost of inaction is too high. This is a NATO Council decision. No new institution. Only a new mandate for an existing one.

II. Short term — within one to two years

5. Classify IRIS² as a European emergency project

In autumn 2022, Elon Musk switched off Starlink over the Ukrainian army's operational area and thereby prevented a strategic attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine — and with it Europe — is dependent on a private communications system whose owner has no democratic accountability.

IRIS², the European LEO satellite system, is in planning. The consortium of eight companies is delivering too slowly: at earliest 2030, realistically 2032. That is too late. Two steps are immediately possible: first, an immediate partnership with Eutelsat/OneWeb as a bridging solution — the capacity exists, the contracts are missing. Second, IRIS² receives the same political acceleration status as the Chips Act: budget priority, simplified approval procedures, quarterly reporting to the Council. This is a budget decision — not a treaty change.

6. Create a European sanctions authority

When Trump announced punitive tariffs on European goods in 2025, the EU threatened the Anti-Coercion Instrument — and did nothing. The problem was not a lack of political will in the moment, but a lack of operational capacity: European sanctions require unanimity or qualified majority, transposition into 27 national legal systems, and then the voluntary cooperation of banks. By the time a measure takes effect, the adversary has found alternative routes.

The United States has OFAC — the Office of Foreign Assets Control. An agency that can impose sanctions within 24 hours and immediately mobilise the entire US financial infrastructure for enforcement. Europe needs an equivalent: an EU sanctions authority with predefined packages of measures that enter into force automatically upon activation by the Council. The Anti-Coercion Instrument is the legal framework — it now needs the operational infrastructure. A legislative measure of 12 to 18 months.

7. C2PA labelling obligation for political AI content

Romania 2024: Călin Georgescu rose from five percent to 23 percent in two weeks — not through deepfakes, but through algorithmic amplification on TikTok. The first EU election annulled due to digital interference. The European Commission opened a DSA investigation against TikTok. More than a year after the event, it has not been concluded.

The technical standard for provenance labelling already exists: C2PA — Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity — was developed by Adobe, Microsoft and Google and embeds invisible metadata in digital content documenting origin and editing history. What is missing is the legal obligation. A supplementary regulation to the AI Act — politically achievable, technically feasible, clear in effect: every AI-generated political content carries a provenance marking. Platforms are required to make it visible. This does not prevent manipulation — but it makes it identifiable.

8. Condition market access in new agreements

Europe treats its single market — 450 million people, 14 trillion euros of GDP, the world's largest trading area — as a self-evident offering extended to everyone who knocks. Countries that sever European underwater cables receive market access. Countries that conduct disinformation campaigns against European democracies receive market access. Countries that carry out coordinated sabotage operations against EU members receive market access.

The lever exists — it is simply not being used. Not retroactively, not for existing agreements: that would injure partners and create legal chaos. But every new trade or partnership agreement receives a norm clause: no systematic sabotage against EU members, verifiable minimum rule of law standard, transparency about state-financed political communication. This is not ideology — it is the description of minimal conditions for trustworthy cooperation. The Mercosur deal, just concluded, would have been the first test case. The next deal is the next opportunity.

The Overarching Logic

These eight measures share a common architecture: they all use instruments Europe already possesses — and has until now either not deployed or not thought through to their conclusion. Galileo exists, but is not treated as mandatory infrastructure. The Blocking Statute exists, but has no protective effect. The digital euro is being developed, but as a consumer rather than strategic instrument. The Hybrid Fusion Cell exists, but does not communicate publicly. IRIS² is planned, but without priority. The Anti-Coercion Instrument exists, but is not activated. C2PA exists, but is not mandatory. Market access exists, but is extended unconditionally.

That is the actual European problem: not missing capacity, but missing consequence. Europe has the tools of a strategic actor — and behaves like an administrator of the status quo.

None of these eight measures requires Hungary's agreement. None requires unanimity. None requires new treaties. None requires a vision that still needs to be formulated. They require only that a qualified majority of European governments decides to use what is already there.

Europe laments its dependencies.
The tools to overcome them
lie unused on the table.