FRE: A FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF EUROPE

The EU is like a house that has been extended so many times that no one knows where the load-bearing walls are anymore. Any attempt to change something could bring the whole building down. So nobody changes anything.

I. The Illusion of Reform

For decades, European politicians have talked about "EU reform." Treaty changes, summit declarations, solemn statements of intent. The result: The EU is just as incapable of action today as it was twenty years ago. In some ways, even less capable.

This is not due to a lack of will on the part of individual actors. It's due to the architecture. The EU is built as a compromise machine — 27 states must decide unanimously on essential questions. This means: The lowest common denominator always wins. Hungary can block sanctions. A single country can water down or prevent any decision.

You can't convert a bicycle into a car by mounting bigger wheels. At some point, you have to accept: You need a new vehicle.

The thesis of this essay: The EU cannot be reformed. It must be replaced by something better. Not through revolution, but through parallel construction. Not against the EU, but alongside it — until it becomes obsolete.

II. Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, 1958

On September 14, 1958, Charles de Gaulle received German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer at his private home in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. It was their first meeting. France and Germany had been enemies three times within seventy years. Millions dead. Destroyed cities. Generations of hatred.

And then: two old men at a table, making a decision.

No commission. No consensus of 27 states. No years of negotiations. Two men who understood: Either we build together, or we both go under.

The European Coal and Steel Community didn't start with all European countries. It started with six. With those who wanted to. The others could join later — on the terms of those who had started.

That's the model: The Coalition of the Willing.

III. Who Are the Willing?

Not all 27 EU members want more Europe. Some want less. Some want the benefits without the obligations. That's their right. But it's no reason to block those who want more.

Four options are on the table. Option A: Germany and France — the historic engine; if both want it, others follow. Option B: Germany and Southern Europe — if France blocks, Spain, Italy, and Portugal have interest. Option C: Germany and the Small Ones — Benelux, Scandinavia, the Baltics: those who already want more Europe. Option D: Core EU plus Outsiders — invite Norway and Switzerland, both richer and more stable than many EU members.

Option D is particularly interesting. Norway and Switzerland are not in the EU — for good reasons. They didn't want to be in this dysfunctional club. But they still pay (EEA contributions, bilateral treaties) and have no voting rights. A Federal Republic of Europe — a real federal state with clear rules, real democracy, real capacity for action — that could interest them. Not today's EU. Tomorrow's Europe.

IV. What Is the FRE?

The Federal Republic of Europe would not be a confederation like the EU. It would be a federal state — like the Federal Republic of Germany, like the United States, like Switzerland.

The FRE would not be bigger than the EU. It would be smaller — but capable of action. Better eight countries that cooperate than 27 that block each other.

V. The Roadmap

Phase 1: The Founding Conference (Year 1). Two to four states meet — not in Brussels, not under EU auspices. At a symbolic location. Perhaps in Colombey again. Perhaps in Aachen, the city of Charlemagne. They declare: We want a European federal state. We invite others to join. Those who don't want to don't have to. But those who want to are welcome — on our terms.

Phase 2: The Constitutional Convention (Year 1–2). No treaty negotiations between governments. A convention of elected representatives — parliamentarians, citizens' representatives, experts — writes a constitution. Short, clear, understandable. Not 400 pages of legalese like the failed EU Constitutional Treaty. The constitution governs: citizens' fundamental rights, federal competencies (foreign policy, defense, currency, trade), member state competencies (everything else), democratic institutions, accession and exit procedures.

Phase 3: The Referendums (Year 2). In each founding country, the people decide. Not the governments, not the parliaments — the citizens. Directly. Yes or No. "Should [Country] become a founding member of the Federal Republic of Europe, with the proposed constitution that transfers [competencies X, Y, Z] to the federation?" Those who say No stay out. No problem. Those who say Yes are in — with all rights and obligations.

Phase 4: The Founding (Year 3). The FRE is founded — parallel to the EU. The founding states are simultaneously EU members and FRE members. This is not a contradiction. The EU allows closer cooperation between member states. The difference: The FRE is not "enhanced cooperation." It's a state. With a government that makes decisions. With a parliament that passes laws. With an army that can act.

Phase 5: Expansion (Year 3+). Other EU members can join — if they accept the constitution, if their citizens agree, if they meet the criteria: functioning democracy (not just on paper), independent judiciary, free press, economic convergence, willingness to transfer sovereignty.

Phase 6: The EU Becomes Obsolete (Year 5–10). At some point, the question will no longer be: "Do you want to join the FRE?" But rather: "Do you want to stay out?" In the end, the EU becomes what it should be: a single market. Nothing more, nothing less. The political union is the FRE.

VI. The Orbán Question

What happens to countries like Hungary? With governments that take EU money but reject EU values? That use the single market but restrict freedom of movement?

The answer is simple: A democratic vote. It's not Orbán who decides — the Hungarian people decide. The question on the ballot: "Should Hungary remain a member of the European Union — with all rights and obligations — or leave the EU?" No ambiguity. No renegotiation. Yes or No. The consequences are known beforehand.

You want to be in the EU? Welcome. With all obligations. You want out? Your decision. With all consequences. You want both? Not an option.

VII. Why It's Possible

Some will object: This is unrealistic. Governments will never do this. Bureaucracies will prevent it.

The same objections could have been made in 1950. Why would France and Germany, after three wars, merge their coal and steel industries? They did it because the alternative was worse.

The alternative is worse again today. America under changing administrations is no longer a reliable partner. China is rising. Russia is aggressive again. The climate crisis requires capacity for action that the EU doesn't have.

Europe has everything it needs: 450 million people, 17 trillion dollars in economic output, the best universities outside America, a quality of life that the rest of the world envies. What Europe lacks is the will. And will doesn't come from Commission decisions. It comes when people have a vision that is bigger than the status quo.

VIII. The Heretical Question

Does Germany even need to be the initiator?

Germany is big, rich, centrally located. Germany is also hesitant, consensus-oriented to the point of paralysis, traumatized by its history.

What if France, Spain, Italy and the Benelux countries start — and invite Germany? That could overcome the German NIbyM reflex (Not Invented by Me). Not "we lead" (too much responsibility), but "we are needed" (flatters the German self-image).

The Germans want to be asked. They want to be part of something that others have started. They want to take responsibility without taking the first step. That's not criticism. That's a diagnosis. And diagnoses are useful when you want to act.

IX. The Actors

Friedrich Merz is Chancellor. But Friedrich Merz is not a chancellor. Merz spent decades on supervisory boards — at BlackRock, at HSBC Trinkaus, at AXA Insurance. Supervisory boards ask questions. They request reports. They approve or reject. They don't make operational decisions. They don't lead. That's not preparation for the Chancellery. The Chancellery demands operational leadership. Quick decisions under uncertainty. Merz can't do that. He never learned.

Söder and Macron — that could be the duo. Emmanuel Macron has fifteen months left. His term ends in May 2027. A president in his final phase has nothing to lose. He can shape his legacy — or go down in history as a failed reformer.

Söder is not an idealist. Söder is a power politician. An opportunist — and that is not meant pejoratively. Opportunists read the situation. They recognize opportunities that idealists overlook. Bavaria is economically strong, traditionally more Francophile than northern Germany — Catholic, conservative, culturally closer to Paris than to London. A Bavarian chancellor and a French president: That's not an unnatural alliance.

X. In the End

Europe invented the Enlightenment. The scientific revolution. Human rights. Democracy. Industrialization. Europe created the modern world.

And now? Now Europe manages its heritage. It optimizes. It regulates. It writes data protection regulations while America builds the platforms and China supplies the hardware. Europe is like an old inventor who sits on his patents and watches others use them.

It doesn't have to stay that way.

The FRE is not a utopia. It's a project. With a beginning, a path, a goal. You don't have to convince everyone — just enough. You don't have to plan everything — just start.

De Gaulle and Adenauer started. With a conversation, at a table, in a house in the French countryside.

Who starts today?

The EU is a compromise machine for 27 states where the lowest common denominator always wins. You can't convert a bicycle into a car by mounting bigger wheels. You need a new vehicle. The FRE is that vehicle: smaller than the EU, but capable of action. Not against Europe — for Europe.