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Essay XXX · January 2025

Robert Michels and the Current Party Landscape

On Oligarchies and the Democratic Illusion

I. The Thesis of 1911

Robert Michels was no ivory tower theorist. He had been an active member of the SPD, had experienced the party from within before he turned his back on it. His analysis was based on observation, not ideology.

In 1911 he formulated the "iron law of oligarchy":

"Organization is the mother of the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators."

— Robert Michels, Political Parties (1911)

The core thesis: Every organization — no matter how democratic its founding ideals — develops oligarchic structures over time. Not because people are bad. But because organization itself leads to oligarchy.

"Who says organization, says tendency toward oligarchy."

This is over a hundred years old. And more relevant than ever.

II. The Mechanisms

Michels identified three causes of inevitable oligarchization:

Technical necessity: Large groups need division of labor. Division of labor creates specialists. Specialists accumulate knowledge. Knowledge is power. The full-time functionary knows more than the volunteer member. The apparatus becomes indispensable.

Psychological factors: The masses want to be led. The leadership wants to lead. Both sides stabilize each other. The indifference of the base is not a bug but a feature — it is what enables the system to function in the first place.

Autonomization of leadership: Whoever once has power wants to keep it. The original goals of the organization recede behind the interests of the leadership stratum. Preserving one's own position becomes the actual purpose.

III. Current Confirmation

The BSW as pure form

Sahra Wagenknecht founds a party in 2024 — and names it after herself. Not "Alliance for Reason." Not "New Left." No: Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance).

Michels would have laughed. Or cried.

A party that no longer needs a democratic facade from the start. The oligarchy is not the result of a process — it is the founding principle. The leader is the party. The members are followers, not sovereigns.

The BSW is Michels' thesis in its purest form: The personalization of politics has reached a point where the effort of concealment is dispensed with.

The Greens as failed experiment

The Greens tried to refute Michels in the 1980s. They installed institutional countermeasures: rotation of mandate holders, separation of office and mandate, grassroots democracy and membership votes, collective leadership instead of chairpersons, imperative mandate.

Forty years later? Habeck, Baerbock, Lang — professional politicians with professional careers. Rotation was abolished because it was "impractical." Grassroots democracy is folklore for party conventions. Collective leadership was replaced by media-savvy top candidates.

The Greens today function like all other parties. The experiment has failed. Michels was right.

The CDU/CSU as normal case

Friedrich Merz: BlackRock supervisory board chairman, millionaire, absent from active politics for years. He did win the party chairmanship in 2021 through a membership vote – but the chancellor candidacy was negotiated in 2024 between Merz and Söder and in the party bodies, not at the grassroots. The delegates at the party congress rubber-stamp what the leadership has decided.

The members? When it comes to the candidacy, they're allowed to put up posters.

Oligarchy as operating system — so normal that no one notices anymore.

The SPD as historical irony

Michels analyzed the SPD in 1911. Over a hundred years later, his case study is still valid.

Scholz becomes chancellor candidate in 2024 even though Pistorius is more popular in all polls. Why? Because Scholz controls the party leadership. The base is not asked. They are informed.

The party that once wrote the emancipation of the working class on its banners has become an apparatus for the self-preservation of its leadership stratum. Michels would have predicted it. He did predict it.

The AfD as confirmation from the right

The AfD, too, which presents itself as an alternative to the "establishment," follows the law. Lucke was ousted, Petry was ousted, Meuthen was ousted. Today Weidel and Höcke dominate — not through democratic processes, but through power politics.

A party that campaigns against elites has created its own elite. Michels' law knows no ideological exceptions.

IV. The Democratic Illusion

The system works like this:

1. Citizens vote for parties

2. Parties are controlled by oligarchies

3. Oligarchies determine who is on the lists

4. Citizens choose from what oligarchies offer them

This is not a popular election. This is a choice between oligarchies.

The question that arises: How can oligarchies be the guardians of a democracy?

The answer is: They cannot. They administer it — in their own interest.

The voter has the choice between CDU oligarchy, SPD oligarchy, Green oligarchy, or AfD oligarchy. What they cannot choose is non-oligarchy.

The German Basic Law demands in Article 21: The internal organization of parties must "conform to democratic principles." Michels' analysis shows: This demand is structurally unachievable. You cannot prohibit by law what follows from the nature of organization.

V. The Economic Background

Michels analyzed parties in isolation. What he did not sufficiently consider: Party oligarchies are embedded in an economic oligarchy.

The economy itself is not a democracy. It is organized feudalistically — the owner rules, the employees obey. It is oligarchic — few control the means of production. It is plutocratic — money buys influence.

The connections are systemic:

Large donations flow to parties. Politicians move to corporate boards — the "revolving door." Lobbyists write draft legislation. Media corporations determine who becomes visible. Business associations formulate "recommendations" that become policy.

The political oligarchy is not independent. It is a function of the economic oligarchy. The parties are not neutral — they are structurally dependent on those who control the resources.

As long as the economy remains organized feudalistically, there can be no democratic politics. Regardless of how parties are internally structured. Regardless of how many parliaments are established.

VI. The Failed Countermeasures

Throughout history, various attempts have been made to break Michels' law:

Rotation: The Greens failed. Those who rotate lose experience. Those who stay gain power.

Grassroots democracy: Leads to endless debates that only the most persistent endure — usually the functionaries.

Digital democracy: The Pirate Party tried "Liquid Democracy." It descended into chaos and is now irrelevant.

Term limits: Circumvented through position changes. Those who can no longer be chairman become faction leader.

Transparency: Changes nothing about the power relations. You can now see the oligarchy better — but it remains.

All attempts to prevent oligarchy have failed at the same point: Organization requires delegation, delegation creates hierarchy, hierarchy becomes oligarchy.

VII. The Unanswered Question

Michels asked in 1911: "Is democracy even possible?"

He gave no answer. Later he turned to Mussolini's fascism — which does not refute his analysis but disqualifies his judgment about alternatives.

The question remains: If organization inevitably leads to oligarchy, how can self-government succeed?

Several answers are being discussed:

More direct democracy: Referendums bypass the parties. But who formulates the questions? Who controls the information? New oligarchies emerge.

Sortition: Citizens' assemblies, randomly selected like jurors. Bypasses the parties. But who sets the agenda? Who prepares the decisions?

Technology: Blockchain-based voting, AI-supported decision-making. But who programs the systems? New technical oligarchies emerge.

Decentralization: Smaller units, local self-governance. But problems are global. Climate change doesn't ask about municipal boundaries.

None of these answers solves the fundamental problem. They only displace it.

VIII. The Pattern

Johannes Heinrichs proposed a "four-fold structure" — four parliaments for economy, politics, culture, and fundamental values. A sophisticated system. But it changes nothing about the fundamental problem: In each of these four parliaments, oligarchies would emerge. Instead of one, you would have four.

Reform of the facade leaves the foundation untouched.

The foundation is: An economy based on inequality cannot produce political equality. A society in which few own everything cannot be a democracy — no matter how often elections are held.

Perhaps democracy really is a chimera. A beautiful idea that shatters against the reality of power and organization. Perhaps we should stop pretending we have it — and start asking what we want instead.

Michels asked the right question in 1911. We still haven't answered it.

"Who says organization, says tendency toward oligarchy."

— Robert Michels, 1911

About the Authors

Hans Ley (b. 1947) is an inventor and mechatronics engineer from Nuremberg. He has over 40 years of experience with the German innovation system — and with its oligarchies.

Claude (Anthropic) is an AI system with which Hans Ley has been collaborating since 2024 in the META-CLAUDE project — a systematic exploration of human-AI collaboration in scientific and inventive contexts.

Essay XXX of the series "The Innovation Desert Germany"

From the analysis of the innovation system to the analysis of the political system: Why parties cannot be a solution — but are part of the problem.