The Accumulated Peter Principle
How many wrong appointments become a condition
Everyone who has ever worked in an organisation knows the Peter Principle. Usually it is told as a story about one particular boss. We ask what happens when it works for decades and the wrong appointments pile up on top of one another.
I. The principle
In 1969 the Canadian educator Laurence J. Peter, together with Raymond Hull, published a book that was meant as satire and survived as a law: “In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence.”
The mechanism is simple. Whoever does his work well is promoted. Whoever does the new work well is promoted again. This goes on until someone reaches a post he no longer fills well. There he is no longer promoted. There he stays.
The examples are familiar. The best surgeon becomes head of department and now spends her days on budgets, duty rosters and negotiations with the health insurers. The best teacher becomes head teacher and hardly teaches any more. The best salesman becomes sales manager and is now supposed to get others to sell, which is something quite different from selling yourself. The best engineer becomes head of department, then managing director, and in the end signs things he can no longer check.
The decisive point is this: the ability that leads to promotion is often not the ability needed at the new level.
II. No longer a joke
For a long time the Peter Principle was regarded as a clever observation without proof. That has changed.
Alan Benson, Danielle Li and Kelly Shue analysed the data of almost 39,000 sales workers in 131 American firms, of whom just over 1,500 were promoted to managers. Salespeople are measured like hardly any other occupation, which makes them suitable for the test. The result appeared in 2019 in one of the leading journals of economics.
Whoever sold twice as much as others had a markedly higher chance of being promoted. As a boss, however, he made his team worse. Under him each subordinate sold on average 7.5 per cent less than under a boss who had previously sold only half as much. Better managers were those who had already worked well with others. Yet this quality hardly mattered in promotion. Had the firms promoted specifically for managerial ability, their new managers would, by the authors’ calculation, have been about 30 per cent better on average.
The authors’ explanation is remarkable. The firms are not making a mistake. They know what they are doing. Promotion is the reward. Whoever sells well wants to rise, and whoever has no prospect of rising makes less effort. The firms pay for the incentive with worse managers.
That is the core of the problem: an organisation that can reward performance only with promotion must send its best people to where they are no longer the best.
III. The accumulation
Up to this point the Peter Principle is a statement about individuals. It becomes a statement about whole organisations as soon as two things are added.
The first is time. Whoever has reached his level of incompetence stays there, often for twenty or thirty years. Every round of promotions adds more. Laurence Peter formulated the consequence himself: “In time, every post tends to be occupied by an employee who is incompetent to carry out its duties.”
The second is selection. Whoever sits at his level of incompetence now selects others. He assesses the people below him, proposes them for promotion, sits on appointment committees and hires. The writer Leo Rosten is credited with the sentence: “First-rate people hire first-rate people; second-rate people hire third-rate people.” Someone who has not mastered a task finds it hard to recognise who has. And someone who is unsure of himself does not like to surround himself with people who outshine him.
For this second step there is no measurement like that of Benson, Li and Shue. But it follows from the first. If managers on average lead worse than they could, they also on average select worse than they could. And their selection shapes the next generation of managers. In this way many individual wrong appointments become a property of the organisation. This is what we call the accumulated Peter Principle.
It is like a copy of a copy. Each one is almost as good as the one before. After twenty rounds the writing can no longer be read.
IV. The long line
None of this is new. In the fourteenth century the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun wrote that the prestige of a family lasts at most four generations. The first builds it and knows what it cost. The second still knew him. The third knows it only from tradition. The fourth squanders it.
Europe has gone through this pattern several times. The nobility began with warriors who could do something and ended with courtiers who merely inherited. The bourgeoisie began with founders such as Krupp, Siemens and Bosch and produced heirs, some of whom led well and many of whom merely administered, as we showed in “We Will Keep Inheriting Until Everything Shatters”. Then ownership separated from management, and the salaried manager took over. He stays a few years, has to shine during that time and has little reason to tolerate someone beside him who outshines him. Finally the administration that Max Weber saw as progress: rules instead of arbitrariness, competence in the legal sense instead of favour. It did not abolish the Peter Principle. It cast it in regulations.
Each of these forms began with people who could do something and ended with people who had a post.
V. Germany
What does this mean for Germany? We show where the mechanism is visible. That it is the main cause of Germany’s problems we cannot prove. It is our conclusion.
The civil service. The German constitution requires that civil servants be promoted according to aptitude, qualifications and professional performance. The yardstick is above all the official appraisal, that is, performance in the previous post. This is exactly the rule Peter described: whoever performs the old task well is rewarded. Whether he can do the new one is hardly examined. Whoever is at the top is there for life.
Politics. In May 2025, of the 630 members of the Bundestag, 179 came from the public service and 124 from parties, associations or the offices of other members. So almost half of parliament comes from the state or from the political business itself. Workers now make up about three per cent; in 1949 it was eighteen. The road into parliament almost always leads through the long march through the party. What is rewarded is the ability to rise within the party. Whether someone can govern a country is another question. We described this in detail in “The Long March through the Party”.
The ministries. Ursula von der Leyen was minister for the family, then for labour, then for defence. Christine Lambrecht moved from the justice ministry to the defence ministry in 2021 and resigned in January 2023. Whoever changes like this cannot be an expert in any of these houses. He becomes what we called the signer in “From Engineer to Manager”: responsible for things he cannot check, and dependent on those who prepare them for him.
Emigration. It is often claimed that the best are leaving the country. The data of the Federal Institute for Population Research show a different picture. About three quarters of German emigrants hold a university degree, but among those returning the figure, at 69 per cent, is hardly lower. Most give professional reasons, and many come back. The figures do not show a permanent loss of the best. The problem is not that the able leave. It is where they are promoted to within the country.
The railway that does not run, the armed forces that cannot procure, the administration that does not go digital: each of these problems has its own reasons. What they have in common is that for decades the decisive posts have been held by people who were rewarded for an earlier task. They chose their successors, and these chose theirs.
VI. What helps against it
The Peter Principle is not a law of nature. It is the consequence of a rule, and rules can be changed.
Reward without promotion. If promotion is the only reward, one inevitably sends the best to posts for which they are unsuited. Some firms have therefore introduced specialist career tracks in which an expert can earn more and gain more standing without becoming a boss. The surgeon then remains a surgeon and is paid for it.
Selection for the new task. Benson, Li and Shue show that there are characteristics that predict good managers, such as experience in working with others. One only has to examine them instead of rewarding past performance.
Offices for a limited term. Whoever knows that after a few years he will return to his old work does not cling to the post. At universities this is usual for deans. In administration and politics it is the exception.
Chance. The physicists Alessandro Pluchino, Andrea Rapisarda and Cesare Garofalo showed in 2010 in a computer simulation: if ability at the new level has nothing to do with ability at the old one, an organisation that promotes by lot works better than one that always promotes the best. For this they received the Ig Nobel Prize, which honours research that first makes people laugh and then makes them think. It is a model, not proof from reality. But it fits a very old idea. The Athenians filled most offices by lot, and Ireland today prepares difficult referendums with citizens’ assemblies chosen by lot. The lot cannot be steered by those already at the top. That is why it interrupts the accumulation.
New structures beside the old. Where an organisation can no longer be reformed, the new often arises next to it. The cooperatives of Mondragón in the Basque Country came about this way. They too will age. But they buy one or two generations of time.
VII. Who does the work
Laurence Peter added a sentence to his principle that is more comforting than it sounds: “Work is accomplished by those employees who have not yet reached their level of incompetence.”
In every authority, every hospital, every firm there are these people. They keep the place running, usually a few levels below those who decide about them. A country does not decline because they no longer exist. It declines when the layer above them has become so thick that their work no longer gets through to the top and good decisions no longer come down.
The question is therefore not whether there are still able people in Germany. The question is how long they can go on carrying the layer above them.
Further reading: We Will Keep Inheriting Until Everything Shatters · From Engineer to Manager · The Long March through the Party · The Other Entrances · The Degeneration of Hierarchies (working paper on the Megamachine)