The General Measure
Whatever is good for me is good. Stated like that, the sentence is harmless, because nobody says it. On the two versions that do work — and on why every single step can be correct and the outcome a catastrophe all the same.
I. The harmless version
Whatever is good for me is good. Whatever is bad for me is bad.
Stated like that, the sentence is useless. Nobody says it, everyone recognises it, everyone condemns it. It describes the egoist, and the egoist is the most thoroughly criticised figure in Western morality. Two thousand years of ethics have finished him off.
That is why criticism of egoism achieves nothing. It aims at a figure that barely exists and leaves untouched the versions that actually work.
II. The version that works
The sentence has to be rewritten to show its force:
Whatever is right for my task is right.
This version everyone says, and it is true. It is not selfish but dutiful. Whoever follows it does not do what benefits him, but what his post requires.
The buyer who takes from an invention the part that fits the existing product range and leaves the rest is acting correctly. That part can be costed; the rest cannot. That he thereby takes precisely the half which changes nothing is not an intention but the definition of what can be procured.
The consultant who teaches a method rather than solving problems with it is acting correctly. Teaching is repeatable, plannable and paid regardless of the outcome. Solving is singular, risky, and the value accrues to the client. Anyone who has to live from it chooses the former. There is no figure that argues against it.
The design engineer who rejects a profile as too expensive is calculating correctly. He calculates with the processes available to him. That another exists, one which overturns the calculation, appears in none of his documents.
In all three cases the measure has migrated from the person into the position. With that it ceases to be visible. One can ask a human being whether he is acting out of self-interest. One cannot ask a post.
III. The version nobody notices any more
The third stage reads:
Whatever keeps the institution going is right.
At the second stage, a person still applies a measure: that of his post. At the third, nobody applies one any more. The institution does what it has always done, and the question of what it was founded for no longer arises in its daily business.
An association investigates a country's capacity for innovation. It surveys 1,358 of its members and finds that problem-solving ability heads the list of competences with the greatest need for further training. It then recommends modular programmes, microlearning, microcredentials, peer-to-peer formats and mentoring. With VDI 4521 it maintains its own three-part guideline series on inventive problem solving with TRIZ. The series does not appear in the study. The words invention, inventing and patent appear nowhere in it.
One may take this for negligence. It is something else. Of the seven experts consulted, none comes from methodology. Recruitment, learning psychology, education economics, labour-market research, coaching. The question of what would have to be learned for problem-solving ability to arise was not rejected. It was not present.
And the recommendations that emerge concern precisely what the association itself offers and what its surroundings sell: formats, access, recognition procedures, funding. Not because anyone ordered it so. But because an institution can only see what lies within its field of view, and its field of view is its own operation.
This holds further than is comfortable.
A university assessed by the third-party funding it attracts will attract third-party funding. That is not an abuse of the indicator but its effect. A funding programme counts as successful once the money has been disbursed; whether anything changed will not be measured years later, because by then the next generation of programmes is running. An editorial office whose existence depends on reach develops a concept of relevance that is called reach. An authority liable for procedural error and not for decisions withheld will conduct procedures and not decide.
In none of these cases does anyone act against their task. In each, the institution has put its own continuation in the place of the purpose for which it was created — and does not notice, because from the inside the two look identical.
IV. The interlocking
The three stages are not three cases. They carry one another.
Whoever is questioned as a person points to his position: I did what my post required.
Whoever is questioned as a position points to the institution: I applied the rules in force.
Whoever is questioned as an institution points to the persons: we reflect what our people report. Eighty per cent see building competence as a precondition. We asked them.
The circle is closed. Each stage legitimises itself through the next, and the last through the first. At no point does anyone stand who would be responsible for the whole, and that is not carelessness in the construction but its design.
This is why the interlocking works best where the participants are decent. A fraudster is assailable. A conscientious person is not.
V. Why moral criticism strengthens the system
Whoever names this connection usually reaches for the accusation. And is refuted.
He has to be refuted, for every single step was correct. He names names, and those named demonstrate that they fulfilled their task. He imputes intentions, and the imputation is false, because there was no intention. At the end stands a critic who was unfair, and a system that has proved itself decent.
The accusation is therefore not merely ineffective. It is the mechanism by which the system cleanses itself. Every deflected reproach is one more piece of evidence.
And it disposes of the matter at the same time. Whoever once counts as the man who went too far need not be heard again. Classification replaces examination. That is the most effective way of dealing with an objection there is, and it costs nothing.
VI. How the measure can be recognised
If intentions yield nothing, one must look elsewhere. Three questions suffice.
Who determines what counts as success? Not who decides, but who sets the criterion. Where beneficiary and measure-setter are the same office, the general measure is in operation, regardless of what the participants want. A funding programme that measures its success by disbursement measures itself against itself.
Who bears the cost, who takes the return? Where the two come apart, the stable omission arises. Whoever invests first in a development whose benefit then accrues to everyone is subsidising his competitors. Not investing is then not laziness but the superior strategy. And because it is superior for everyone, the investment fails to happen at all, although for all of them together it would have been the better course.
What happens to the objection? This is the sharpest of the three. Is it examined, is it rejected, or is it classified? The third possibility is the most revealing. An objection that is given a place — as a marginal position, as a forerunner, as a contribution worth considering — has been disposed of without having been answered. It becomes a chapter and ceases to be an objection.
VII. What is missing
From the three questions one can read off what a system would need in order to be resistant to the general measure.
An authority that measures by the result and not by the execution — and which gains nothing from it.
An office whose official duty is objection, which is paid for it, and which is not subordinate to the one it contradicts.
And a period that expires without anyone having to be convinced.
None of this presupposes a disposition. Precisely there lies the prospect. Appeals to responsibility, culture and attitude are the attempt to replace the measure with a better human being — and that attempt is as old and as failed as the criticism of egoism.
VIII. The measure and this text
The uncomfortable application remains.
Whoever describes the general measure stands somewhere himself. The complaint about a system is also a position, and it has its return: it explains one's own failure by the circumstances. Whoever was passed over has an interest in the reason lying in the passing over and not in the matter itself. That is the same mechanism, only from the other side.
From this follows no modesty but a sharpening. The reproach is worthless, this one included. What counts is the case another can recalculate: a figure, a date, a procedure, a text with a page reference. Everything that exists only as indignation belongs to the other side.
The general measure has a single weakness. It does not depend on agreement, but it does depend on being unverifiable. Where something can be recalculated, it no longer works. That is little. But it is the only thing that can be produced without permission.