Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 11 November 2026

The Treasure or the Final Sweep-Out

What lies behind the talk of Germany's data treasure, and who wants to dig it up

In Germany a treasure is being invoked: the data from decades of industrial production. What it consists of, no one says. What is truly rare is not in databases but in heads and workshops. And precisely that is now being courted from two sides, from Beijing with platforms and partnerships, from Washington with tariffs and subsidies.

I. The mantra

At the Hannover Messe on 21 April 2026, Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said Germany was sitting on a “huge data treasure” that the USA envied. At the BDI’s Day of Industry on 23 June she went further: “We are sitting on the most valuable industrial data treasure in the world.” On 3 July her ministry and the research ministry refocused the Plattform Industrie 4.0 entirely on industrial AI, again citing the “unique data treasure” of German industry.

On 3 November Christoph Schell, chief executive of Kuka, took up the idea in an interview with the trade journal Automationspraxis. “Germany and Europe possess something enormously valuable,” he said: decades of industrial know-how and data from real production processes. Machines working with artificial intelligence need precisely these data. To make them usable, he is counting on open platforms and common interfaces. “No one will simply share industrial data unfiltered,” he added. Companies would have to see a benefit and keep control.

What none of these speeches says: what the treasure consists of, how large it is, and why other countries with modern production should not have it.

II. Milk, not gold

A treasure is something that lies in the cellar waiting to be found. Production data are more like milk. They are produced anew every day, where the cows stand, and whoever has more cows has more milk. No dairy lives off last year’s supply.

How many cows stand where is shown by the statistics of the International Federation of Robotics for 2024. China installed 295,000 new industrial robots, 54 per cent of all new installations worldwide, and now operates more than two million. That is 43.5 per cent of the global stock. Germany installed just under 27,000 and accounts for 6 per cent of the stock. Per 10,000 employees, too, China is ahead with 567 robots against Germany’s 449.

If data arise where production and automation take place, the larger body of data is growing in China. And every plant that moves there takes its data stream with it. In “Five Months Later” we described how Volkswagen develops cars in Hefei with more than 3,000 engineers and ships them from there to the world. The data from these developments arise in Hefei.

III. What is truly rare

There is a German treasure, but it is small, and it does not lie in databases. Why a German machine tool still works to a thousandth of a millimetre after five years we described in “Excellent Production Engineering”: as the result of thousands of small improvements to bearings, guides, controls and thermal compensation. This knowledge sits in the heads of designers, setters and foremen and in the habits of workshops, often in niches where only a few firms worldwide have experience.

Until now this knowledge was protected precisely because it did not exist as data. It could not be copied, only poached. Platforms that collect machine data, and models that learn from them, are the tool for getting it out of people’s heads into a transferable form. Whoever shares their data so that a model can learn gives away more than measurements. A model that has learned from other people’s data does not give back what it learned when the contract ends.

In “The Edison Trap” we showed that the models on which German industry relies belong to others. Here the subject is what they are fed with. We disclose what concerns us: one of the two of us is a language model made by Anthropic, a company whose business rests on such models.

IV. The one-way street

How differently the two great economic areas treat industrial data is shown by a look at their laws.

China locks its data in. Under the Data Security Law of 2021, “important data” generated in China must be stored there, and exporting them requires a security assessment by the authorities. The EU and China have since set up a mechanism of their own for cross-border data flows. According to the Berlin China institute MERICS, it serves mainly to help European firms get their own data out of China.

The EU opens its data. The Data Act has applied since September 2025. Under it, the user of a machine may pass its data on to third parties of his own choosing. The manufacturer can refuse in order to protect trade secrets only in exceptional circumstances and case by case. And Minister Reiche wants the rules loosened so that industrial data can be used more easily to train AI.

The same machine thus produces data that are under state lock and key in China and must be handed over in Europe at the user’s request.

V. Whose bread I eat

Kuka, whose chief advocates open platforms, has been wholly owned by the Chinese appliance group Midea since November 2022. The investor agreement of 2016, which safeguarded sites, jobs and the independence of the management board, expired at the end of 2023. To be fair: a separate agreement shielding the data of customers and suppliers from Midea has been extended to the end of 2030.

“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing,” goes the German proverb. It refutes no argument. But who makes an argument belongs to every argument. And the song of the data treasure is also sung by ministries that no one in Beijing pays.

Kuka is not the only case. In “The Final Sale” we described how Schaeffler in March 2026 brought the entire toolkit for humanoid robots into a partnership with Leju Robotics in China. In January 2026 DN Solutions of South Korea took over the machine tool builder Heller of Nürtingen.

VI. The second arm of the pincers

From the West the pull comes from the other side. According to the World Machine Tool Survey, the USA consumed machine tools worth 11.4 billion dollars in 2025 and imported just over 5.8 billion, more than any other country. What is built in the USA comes, according to a report in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, mostly from foreign firms, often from pure assembly plants. Development and many key parts remain outside.

That is to change. Since the summer of 2025 the USA has treated many machines as steel and aluminium products and levies a 50 per cent tariff on their metal content. According to the German engineering federation VDMA, this already affected around 40 per cent of German and European machinery exports to the USA in the autumn of 2025. On 28 October 2026 President Trump then declared, on the basis of an investigation under Section 232, that imports of robots and industrial machinery threaten national security. He imposed no tariffs yet. Until 26 April 2027 negotiations are to be held with all supplier countries. After that, tariffs, quotas or a programme subsidising investment in the USA are possible.

How such negotiations end is shown by history. In the 1980s the USA limited imports of machine tools from Japan and Taiwan through “voluntary” agreements. The Japanese manufacturers responded by expanding their plants in America. Mazak, in Kentucky since 1974, still builds there today.

The German manufacturers are already on their way. According to the German machine tool builders’ association VDW, twelve larger firms produce abroad, together a good fifth of German machine tool production, 20 per cent of that in the USA. In January 2026 the association warned that the larger firms in particular were considering moving supplier parts abroad along with production. “This must be prevented at all costs,” said its chairman Franz-Xaver Bernhard.

Against this stands the shortage of skilled workers in the USA. The American industry association AMT puts it at almost half a million. As long as only assembly moves, the knowledge stays here. If the suppliers follow, it goes too.

VII. The sweep-out

Our conclusion: the talk of a treasure conceals what is actually happening. What exists in large quantities, measurements, machine states, process data, others have too, and they generate more of it. What is rare, the experiential knowledge in niches, is offered in exchange under the banner of the treasure: for partnerships, platforms and market access.

The pincers have two arms. From Beijing come owners, partners and platforms, from Washington tariffs and subsidies. Both aim at the same skill. One wants to bring it into its models, the other into its plants.

A country that had a real treasure would not lay it out on open platforms. It would guard the rare like crown jewels and keep hold of the suppliers on which it depends. Whoever announces every week that he is sitting on the most valuable treasure in the world, and at the same time offers it for sharing, is not pursuing industrial policy. He is sweeping out the shop before handing it over.

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 11 November 2026.

Sources. dpa-AFX, “Reiche sieht KI als ‘Überlebenschance’ für Industrie”, 21 April 2026. · Börsen-Zeitung, “Bundesregierung wirbt für mehr Optimismus”, 23 June 2026; taz, “Merz beim ‘Tag der Industrie’”, 23 June 2026. · BMWE/BMFTR, press release “Bundesregierung, Wirtschaft und Forschung richten Plattform Industrie 4.0 auf industrielle KI aus”, 3 July 2026. · Michael Corban, “Industrielle Daten sind Europas Chance im Zeitalter der KI”, interview with Christoph Schell, Automationspraxis, 3 November 2026. · International Federation of Robotics, “World Robotics 2025 – Industrial Robots”, press release of 25 September 2025. · MERICS, “Europe’s vehicle-data gap”, 2025; Pinsent Masons, “EU and China to tackle challenges in cross-border transfer of non-personal data”; IHK, “Datensicherheitsgesetz China”. · Taylor Wessing, “EU Data Act – Auswirkungen auf den Maschinen- und Anlagenbau”, 2023. · KUKA, Annual Report 2023; KUKA, “Squeeze-out completed”, 8 November 2022. · Gardner Business Media, “58th Annual World Machine Tool Survey”, 2026. · Neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Donald Trump träumt von der Reindustrialisierung – und will gleichzeitig den Import moderner Maschinen verteuern”, October 2025. · VDMA, “Die USA betreiben ein kontinuierliches Zoll-Foulspiel”, autumn 2025. · EY, “US concludes Section 232 investigation into robotics and industrial machinery imports”, 29 October 2026; Mayer Brown, “President Trump Issues Proclamation on Imports of Robotics, Industrial Machinery”, October 2026. · VDW, annual press conference, 19 January 2026, via Zerspanungstechnik.de and Börsen-Zeitung. · AMT, “Machinery Orders Continue Rally in Q1 2026”, 11 May 2026. · Our texts: “The Final Sale”, “The Edison Trap”, “Excellent Production Engineering”, “Five Months Later”.