The Impossible Axis
Germany and Russia — a relationship that must not be
I. The Pattern
There is a question that is almost never asked in Germany. It goes: Why has close cooperation between Germany and Russia never lasted?
The usual answers are: History. Ideology. Values. The crimes of World War II. The differences between democracy and autocracy. Russia's aggression.
None of that is wrong. But it's incomplete.
Because when you look at the history of the last 150 years, a pattern emerges. Every time Germany and Russia draw closer, something happens. Every time a German-Russian axis becomes possible, it is prevented. Every time.
Coincidence? Perhaps. Or perhaps not.
II. The Logic
To understand the pattern, you must understand the geopolitical logic.
Germany has what Russia lacks: technology, industry, capital, organization, access to the world's oceans.
Russia has what Germany lacks: resources, space, energy, raw materials, strategic depth.
Together they would be a power that needs no one else. An autarkic Eurasian economic zone. A land power that doesn't have to take orders from sea powers.
That is the nightmare of every sea power. It was Britain's nightmare in the 19th century. It is America's nightmare in the 21st.
Halford Mackinder, the founder of modern geopolitics, clearly named the danger in 1904:
In substance, he warned: should Germany ally herself with Russia, the balance would tip in favor of the Eurasian heartland — its vast resources would then be available for building a fleet, and "the empire of the world would then be in sight."
This is not a conspiracy theory. This is geopolitics. Preventing a German-Russian axis is not malicious intent — it is strategic necessity from the perspective of any sea power.
III. The History
150 Years of Pattern
You can explain each of these events individually. The stupidity of Wilhelm II. Hitler's brutality. Putin's aggression. All true.
But the pattern remains. Every time a German-Russian axis emerges or could emerge, it is destroyed — by war, by division, or by other means.
IV. The American Perspective
America has never hidden this. At least not from its own audience.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the most influential American geostrategist of the postwar era, wrote in 1997:
"The most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an 'antihegemonic' coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances."
Brzezinski does not mention Germany at this point — but one need not think long about what Germany joining this bloc would have meant to him.
George Friedman, founder of the geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor, said in a 2015 lecture to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs:
"The primordial interest of the United States, over which for centuries we have fought wars — the First, the Second and Cold Wars — has been the relationship between Germany and Russia, because united there, they're the only force that could threaten us. And to make sure that that doesn't happen."
This is not a conspiracy theory. This is official analysis. This is what American strategists tell their own audience. They don't consider it reprehensible — they consider it necessary.
V. Nord Stream
The most recent case is also the most illuminating.
Nord Stream was the largest infrastructure project between Germany and Russia since World War II. Two pipelines through the Baltic Sea, directly from Russia to Germany, without transit through third countries.
The United States fought against it — from the beginning. For decades. Under Bush, under Obama, under Trump, under Biden. First warnings, then from 2019 sanctions against companies that helped build the pipelines. Threats against allies. Public warnings.
The arguments changed: First it was about energy security. Then about Ukraine. Then about Russia's aggression. But the goal remained constant: Prevent Nord Stream.
In February 2022, President Biden said at a press conference with Chancellor Scholz:
"If Russia invades, then there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it."
Reporter: "But how will you do that? It's under Germany's control."
Biden: "I promise you, we will be able to do that."
In September 2022, the pipelines were blown up.
Who did it has still not been conclusively established. American journalist Seymour Hersh claims it was the United States. The German Federal Prosecutor is pursuing a Ukrainian lead and in 2025 had suspects arrested in Italy and Poland — who gave the orders remains open.
Maybe it was the USA. Maybe not. The result is the same: The German-Russian energy axis is destroyed. The pattern continues.
VI. The Counterarguments
One must be fair. There are good counterarguments:
Germany and Russia had their own reasons for conflicts. Wilhelm II was a fool. Hitler was a criminal. Putin is an aggressor. You don't need a foreign conspiracy to explain these conflicts.
The USA built Germany up, not destroyed it. The Marshall Plan, the NATO security guarantee, support for reunification — America was Germany's most important ally.
Russia's behavior destroyed the relationships. The annexation of Crimea, the attack on Ukraine — these were Russian decisions, not American intrigues.
Correlation is not causation. That something keeps happening doesn't prove that someone is causing it.
All of that is true. And yet the pattern remains. And yet the question persists: Why could a German-Russian partnership never last?
VII. German Blindness
The most astonishing thing about this history is how little it is discussed in Germany.
In America, preventing a German-Russian axis is official strategy. Strategists like Brzezinski and Friedman speak about it openly. It's not a conspiracy — it's policy.
In Germany, the subject is dismissed as conspiracy theory. Anyone who brings it up is considered anti-American, a Putin apologist, a tinfoil hat wearer.
This is peculiar. Germany endlessly discusses its relationship with the United States, about values and interests, about alliance loyalty and strategic autonomy. But the fundamental question — whether German sovereignty has limits defined from outside — is not asked.
Perhaps because the answer would be uncomfortable.
For if it's true that a close German-Russian relationship is not permitted for geopolitical reasons — then Germany is not as sovereign as it believes. Then the room for maneuver in German foreign policy is narrower than official speeches suggest. Then there are red lines that must not be crossed.
That would explain why, in the Nord Stream case, the question of who gave the orders remains open. Why hardly anyone asks it in public debate.
Some questions are better left unasked.
VIII. The Perspective
This essay is not a plea for a German-Russian alliance. Russia under Putin is an aggressive state that violates international law and attacks neighboring countries. A close partnership with this Russia would be neither possible nor desirable.
But Russia will not be ruled by Putin forever. And geography doesn't change. Germany will always lie in the middle of Europe, with Russia as its largest neighbor to the east. The question of German-Russian relations will keep arising.
The question is: Will Germany be able to shape this relationship itself? Or will it — as in the last 150 years — be shaped by others?
This is not a rhetorical question. It is the fundamental question of German foreign policy. And it is rarely asked, because the answer would destroy the illusion of complete sovereignty.
IX. The Lesson
What does the pattern teach us?
First: Geopolitics is real. The interests of great powers don't disappear because we ignore them. The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that Eurasia doesn't fall under the control of a hostile power. This isn't malice — it's strategy.
Second: Germany is not as free as it believes. There are red lines that must not be crossed. One of them is apparently too close an entanglement with Russia.
Third: Understanding doesn't mean justifying. One can understand American strategy without endorsing it. One can consider the destruction of Nord Stream a crime while still understanding the logic behind it.
Fourth: History repeats — until you understand it. The pattern of the last 150 years will continue as long as the basic constellation remains the same: Germany in the middle, Russia in the east, the USA as a sea power wanting to control Eurasia.
The question is not whether the pattern will repeat. The question is whether Germany this time understands what is happening — and finds its own path.
Some axes are not merely unwanted.
They are impossible.
Not because the participants want it that way —
but because others won't allow it.
X. The New Situation
While this essay was being written, the world changed. Or more precisely: it showed what it always was.
In 2025, the United States is negotiating with Russia about Ukraine — without Europe, without Ukraine itself. A 28-point plan is presented that largely meets Russian demands: territorial concessions, no NATO membership, reduction of Ukrainian armed forces. The American National Security Strategy speaks of Europe's "civilizational erasure" and demands that Europe defend itself.
The American president meets the Russian president in Alaska. He calls the Ukrainian president ungrateful. He demands five percent of GDP for defense. He threatens allies with tariffs. He questions NATO.
This is not a conspiracy theory. This is the news.
The irony is bitter: Germany abandoned the German-Russian axis — and now the United States is moving closer to Russia. Germany lost Nord Stream, restructured its energy supply, damaged its economy, destroyed its relationship with Russia. All trusting in America. And America is now negotiating with Putin about Europe's future.
The pattern repeats — just differently than expected. The impossible axis remains impossible. But not because America prevents it. Rather because Germany destroyed it itself — and now stands without a partner.
Epilogue
Bismarck knew it. He did everything to cultivate the relationship with Russia, despite all differences, despite all conflicts. He knew that Germany would be ground between the fronts if it made Russia an enemy.
After Bismarck, Germans forgot this lesson. Twice. The results were World War I and World War II.
Today Germany faces a new situation. The old question — how do you remain America's ally without becoming Russia's enemy? — has become moot. Germany is now Russia's enemy. And America is no longer the ally one can rely on.
The new question is: What does a country do that has burned its bridges to the east while its bridges to the west are collapsing?
Europe is trying to organize itself. ReArm Europe, around 800 billion euros, strategic autonomy. It's late. Very late. But perhaps not too late.
The answer begins with asking the question at all. For decades, Germany trusted that the Americans meant well. That the transatlantic partnership was based on values. That shared interests meant what the words said.
That illusion is over.
What remains is geography. Germany lies in the middle of Europe. Russia lies to the east. America lies on the other side of the ocean. And geography cannot be voted out — not even by American presidents.
The coming years will show whether Germany learns from this. Whether it finally understands that it must define its own interests — not Washington, not Moscow, not Brussels. Whether it grasps that sovereignty is not a gift but a task.
The pattern of the last 150 years is clear. The question is whether Germany can break it this time.
Germany and Russia:
Neighbors who were not allowed to be partners.
Now they are enemies.
And the ally who wanted that
is negotiating with the enemy.