Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 9 November 2026, supplemented 10 November 2026

Only Strength Preserves Peace

Fritz Kraemer, Hubertus Hoffmann and Friedrich Merz

From the series The Conductors of the Leaders · Part I, The Dead

The series asks which ideologies and mentors stand behind those in power and what they actually achieve. It proceeds case by case; each text stands on its own. The typology comes at the end, not at the beginning.

A German chancellor speaks a sentence in the Bundestag that has an ancestry. It does not come from a party programme but from the Pentagon of the Cold War. We follow the wire along which it travelled and ask what the word “only” does to it.

I. The sentence

On 14 May 2025 Friedrich Merz gave his first government statement. On the Bundeswehr he said: “We want to be able to defend ourselves so that we do not have to defend ourselves. […] There are few lessons from recent history that can be transferred to the present as precisely as this one; for this lesson is simple: strength deters aggression, weakness on the other hand invites aggression.” The record notes applause from the Union and from members of the SPD.

Five months later, on 16 October 2025, the sentence became shorter: “Only strength preserves peace. And weakness makes peace waver. That is one of the historical lessons Europe has drawn from its own history.” On 1 October 2026, when the Westphalian Peace Prize was awarded to NATO in Münster, Merz said of Russia: “But the language of strength is evidently understood in the Kremlin.”

On the day of the first government statement, the SPD member Siemtje Möller, Merz’s coalition partner, replied: “It is no sign of weakness when we try to resolve conflicts by diplomatic means.” So the government itself already speaks two languages. Merz’s sentence has an ancestry, and it can be traced.

II. The ancestry

The doctrine that weakness invites attack has a name: “provocative weakness”. It was coined by Fritz Kraemer, an emigrant from Germany who sat in the Pentagon from the fifties until 1978 as civilian adviser to the Army Chief of Staff. We portrayed him in “The Invisible Mentor”: the man with the monocle who discovered and promoted Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig, never wrote a book, and kept silent about his father, who starved in Theresienstadt.

His founding example was Munich 1938. Chamberlain and Daladier gave in to Hitler, and Hitler understood giving in as an invitation. Kraemer made a general rule of it, and it became the core of what the Americans later called “peace through strength”. “No provocative weakness, please!” became his catchphrase.

How close Kraemer came to power is shown by the White House records. In October 1969 Kissinger put a memorandum of Kraemer’s before President Nixon, “The Modern World, A Single ‘Strategic Theater’”. Nixon read it with great interest, wrote “good analysis” in the margin and had it sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence. In September 1971 Kissinger mentioned in the Oval Office his “right-wing friend in the Pentagon” who kept sending him papers on provocative weakness. Nixon answered: “Tell him that I do read his stuff.” At Kissinger’s side stood Alexander Haig, whom Kraemer had recommended to him in 1969 as military assistant, and on the National Security Council staff worked Kraemer’s son Sven. Kraemer had no office in the White House. He had people in it.

On 24 October 1972 he himself sat for half an hour with Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office. As far as the recordings show, it was the only meeting of its kind in Nixon’s presidency; Haig was not allowed to attend. Kissinger was negotiating in Paris for an agreement to end the Vietnam war, and the presidential election was two weeks away. Nixon opened by praising Kraemer’s analyses. Kraemer argued against the course: concessions were being made to Hanoi so as to be able to show peace before the election. Kissinger replied that they could not make demands that would prolong the negotiations beyond election day. Kraemer suggested demanding that North Vietnam withdraw its troops from the South. He meant it seriously. The draft left the North Vietnamese troops standing in South Vietnam, and that was exactly where Kraemer saw the weakness. Kissinger answered that this had already been proposed. Kraemer warned that whoever could not cope with North Vietnam would be seen as weak throughout the world. Nixon saw the stakes as similarly large: “The whole foreign policy of the United States is on the line here.” The Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973. The North Vietnamese troops stayed in the South.

After that Kraemer did not speak a word to Kissinger for thirty years, until his death in 2003. The break came from his side. The sources document no personal occasion. What they document is a fundamental opposition that had long been building. As early as August 1971 Kissinger had told him that his memorandum had been “read with approbation but no prospect of action.” Kraemer saw in the Vietnam compromise, in arms control with Moscow and in the opening to Beijing the same provocative weakness, and he considered it driven by the electoral calendar. Haig, who stayed loyal to him and tried in vain to mediate, said in 2000 that Kraemer “detests Henry today, even though he was Henry’s father in the United States”, “because Fritz is an ideologue and a principled individual who’d never compromise on his beliefs.” Kissinger himself, in his eulogy, explained the break as the tension between the prophet and the policymaker: “For the prophet, values are eternal, independent of time.” The policymaker, by contrast, has to reckon with time, with elections, balances of power and what can be reached at the negotiating table. Kraemer had lost, but he had fought all the way into the Oval Office against ending the war on these terms. When Donald Rumsfeld stepped down as Secretary of Defense in December 2006, he said it should be clear “that not only is weakness provocative, but the perception of weakness on our part can be provocative as well.” How the doctrine ran through Kraemer’s pupils into the Iraq war of 2003 we described in “The Machine within the Machine”.

How does such a sentence travel from the Pentagon into the German Bundestag? One of the wires has a name.

III. The keeper of the flame

Hubertus Hoffmann, born in 1955, from Goslar, was in the eighties what used to be called a young CDU security politician. He advised Peter Kurt Würzbach, parliamentary state secretary in the defence ministry, chaired the CDU’s committee for foreign and security policy in Lower Saxony for ten years, and wrote on nuclear strategy. Later he became an entrepreneur and investor, and in 2002 he founded the World Security Network, a network for foreign and security policy.

Kraemer was Hoffmann’s mentor from 1978 until his death in 2003. Hoffmann devoted two books to him: “Fritz Kraemer on Excellence” (2004) and “True Keeper of the Holy Flame” (2012). The title comes from Rumsfeld, who had called Kraemer “a true keeper of the flame”. Hoffmann has carried the flame ever since: collecting Kraemer’s sayings, dedicating events to him and continuing his doctrine in essays of his own.

Fairness requires saying that Hoffmann does not simply repeat the doctrine. He calls for a foreign policy he names “World 3.0”, a double strategy of power and reconciliation, of hard and soft factors. One must avoid provocative weakness and deter credibly, he writes, but equally work for tolerance and understanding. He founded an initiative for “Codes of Tolerance” and co-produced the documentary “Watani: My Homeland”, about a family from Aleppo who come to his hometown of Goslar. The film was nominated for an Oscar. The keeper of the flame is no pure hawk.

IV. The German circle

The 2012 book contains contributions from Kissinger, Haig and Rumsfeld, and from Germany among others from Klaus Naumann, former Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, and from Friedrich Merz. Naumann had already published an essay in the World Security Network in 2004 entitled “Enhance Patriotism and Overcome ‘Provocative Weakness’ in Europe Now!”

In the book Merz praises Kraemer as a “man of the performance elite, of substance, excellence and character, who lived and fought for his values”. The book was presented in Berlin in January 2013, in the Museum Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, with the former BND president August Hanning and the former Inspector General Harald Kujat as speakers. Hoffmann and Merz had known each other for a long time by then, if one follows Hoffmann’s own account: according to it Merz, then a member of the European Parliament, belonged in the early nineties to a study group on the Baltic region founded by Hoffmann.

Just as important is what we do not know. We do not know whether Merz ever met Kraemer. We have no evidence that Hoffmann advises Merz today. And the formula is not Kraemer’s property: “peace through strength” was Reagan’s slogan, and “si vis pacem, para bellum” goes back to the Romans. Merz is not Kraemer’s pupil the way Kissinger was. Merz is in any case reputed to dislike being advised. But he professed his admiration for Kraemer in writing, years before he became chancellor, and today he speaks Kraemer’s sentence.

So the wire does not run from teacher to pupil, but through a book, a circle and a profession of faith. For this series that is a type of its own.

V. Two readings of strength

The break of autumn 1972 is the key to Merz’s sentence. Kissinger wanted strength in order to be able to negotiate: with Moscow on arms limitation, with Beijing on the opening. Kraemer considered exactly this détente provocative weakness. Both believed in strength. One saw it as the basis for negotiation, the other as its substitute.

The rift runs even through the circle at Checkpoint Charlie. Harald Kujat, one of the speakers of 2013, wrote in January 2022, shortly before the Russian attack, that the West must negotiate with Russia “from a position of strength”. A year later he said that arms deliveries meant the war would be pointlessly prolonged. Kujat is today one of the sharpest critics of the Ukraine policy for which Merz stands.

Merz’s own sentences contain both readings. “So that we do not have to defend ourselves” is deterrence as the Federal Republic practised it for forty years. In Münster he also said that unity and strength were “today too conditions for success in negotiations with Moscow”, and that Germany wanted stable relations with Russia “at the appropriate time”. That is Kissinger. The word “only”, on the other hand, is Kraemer.

VI. The counter-check

When was the doctrine right? Munich 1938 is its strongest case. Hitler understood concession as invitation; that is documented. For the present, 2014 is often cited: the annexation of Crimea was followed by sanctions, and eight years later by the attack on the whole of Ukraine. Whether the one caused the other is disputed. It cannot be proven.

When was it wrong? Before 1914 the European great powers armed against each other, in July 1914 they mobilised, and each did so to deter the others. Each read the others’ strength as a threat and answered with strength of its own. Deterrence became a spiral, and at its end stood the war that no side had wanted in that form. The doctrine’s second defeat is its own consequence: the Iraq war of 2003 was a war waged by those who did not want to show provocative weakness.

And finally the détente Kraemer so despised. Out of it came the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In it the Soviet Union signed commitments to human rights that it did not mean seriously, and its dissidents took it at its word: the Moscow Helsinki Group, Charter 77 in Prague. Who ended the Cold War, Reagan’s arms build-up or détente, is disputed to this day. Probably it was both. With “only” it cannot be explained at all.

VII. The word “only”

Our conclusion: Merz’s sentence is right without the word “only” and wrong with it. Strength can preserve peace. But whoever says that only strength preserves it declares everything else to be weakness: negotiation, treaty, concession, the conversation with the adversary. That was Kraemer’s doctrine, and it was the reason he cut Kissinger for thirty years.

The doctrine has a second gap: it does not say when strength is enough. Deterrence needs a measure, otherwise it becomes a spiral as in 1914, or a business model as we described in “The Peace-Loving”. Kraemer never named that measure; he only warned against too little. A chancellor who quotes the “historical lesson” would have to say both: what strength is for, and how one recognises that it suffices.

In 2012 Merz did not praise just any strategist. He praised the man who in 1972 argued in the Oval Office against the terms on which a war was to be ended, because they were weakness, and who broke with his most famous pupil over it. That gives the sentence “only strength preserves peace”, in the mouth of this chancellor, a weight it would not have coming from Reagan or the Romans.

In Münster Merz gave a hint of what it is to be for: for negotiations, at the appropriate time. Then he is closer to Kissinger than to the man he praised as a “man of the performance elite”. But it may be a long time before the appropriate time comes. Within his own party his future is already being openly disputed, and whether he will still be chancellor then is doubtful. Just as doubtful is whether Europe will sit at the negotiating table at all, or whether others will negotiate over its head. A strength that never gets to negotiate would in the end be Kraemer’s strength after all: substitute instead of preparation.

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 9 November 2026, supplemented 10 November 2026.

Sources. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 21/3, 14 May 2025, government statement by the Chancellor (Merz) and speech by Siemtje Möller; quotations translated by us. · Bulletin der Bundesregierung: government statement of 16 October 2025; speech at the Westphalian Peace Prize, Münster, 1 October 2026 (no. 93-2); report in leinetal24 on the Münster speech. · Hubertus Hoffmann, Fritz Kraemer on Excellence, New York 2004; True Keeper of the Holy Flame. The Legacy of Pentagon Strategist and Mentor Dr Fritz Kraemer, London/Berlin 2012. · Invitation to the book presentation “Pentagon-Stratege Dr. Fritz Kraemer und die Welt 3.0”, World Security Network Foundation, ECFR and Mauermuseum, Berlin, 22 January 2013 (with the Merz quotation). · Wikipedia (German/English), “Hubertus Hoffmann” and “Fritz G. A. Kraemer” (as of 2026); Hubertus Hoffmann, author profiles at Codes of Tolerance and Speakers Academy. · Klaus Naumann, “Enhance Patriotism and Overcome ‘Provocative Weakness’ in Europe Now!”, World Security Network, 8 December 2004. · Hubertus Hoffmann, contributions on “World 3.0” in globalo.com and Times of Israel Blogs. · Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, vol. XII, doc. 92 (editorial note on Kraemer’s memorandum of 29 September 1969). · Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, vol. XIII, doc. 295 (note on the Kissinger–Kraemer telephone call of 3 August 1971). · UPI, “Remembering Fritz Kraemer”, 31 January 2005 (Kissinger’s eulogy of 8 October 2003). · Nixon White House Tapes, conversation 806-9, 24 October 1972 (Miller Center); Luke A. Nichter, “Who Was Fritz Kraemer? And Why We Should Care”, History News Network / nixontapes.org (with the recordings of 18 September 1971 and 24 October 1972). · Len Colodny, Tom Shachtman, The Forty Years War, New York 2009 (Rumsfeld quotation 2006). · Harald Kujat, “Der Westen muss mit Russland verhandeln – aus der Position der Stärke heraus”, Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten, 10 January 2022; interview in Zeitgeschehen im Fokus, 18 January 2023. · Berliner Zeitung, report on Merz’s dealings with advisers, 2026; on the debate over Merz’s future within the Union: statement by the eight CDU state premiers (report in blue News) and interview with Alexander Hoffmann (CSU), heidelberg24.