[Title Pending]
A note in the record of the technical and scientific intelligentsia, our own included
Technically, scientists, engineers and inventors work together worldwide more closely than almost any other profession. Ethically and morally, each of them stands alone.
I. The Sweet Part
In April 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer had to explain to a board of the United States Atomic Energy Commission why he had first opposed the hydrogen bomb and then no longer did. His answer is the most honest sentence an engineer or scientist has ever spoken about his profession: when you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it, and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That, he said, is the way it was with the atomic bomb.
This is not the confession of a villain. It is the description of a normal state. Anyone who has ever sat over a difficult problem knows the pull: the problem is interesting, the solution is taking shape, the budget is in place, the colleagues are good. In that state the question of what the result will be used for is merely a nuisance. It is postponed, and in most cases it is never called up again.
We engineers and inventors are the cause of progress. We are equally the cause of ruin, and it cannot be ruled out that in the end we will be the cause of humanity’s downfall. Measured against this effect, we think astonishingly little about it. In this sense we are the biggest fools in the universe: we know exactly how something works, and we hardly ask what it is for.
II. A German Engineer
The firm J. A. Topf & Söhne in Erfurt built breweries and malting plants. From 1939 it also built cremation furnaces for the concentration camps: for Buchenwald, Dachau, Mauthausen, Gross-Rosen and Auschwitz. Its senior engineer Kurt Prüfer designed the furnaces of the four large crematoria of Auschwitz-Birkenau, travelled to the camps to supervise construction, and came back when a chimney showed cracks. His superior Fritz Sander filed a patent application on 26 October 1942 for a furnace that was to operate without interruption. It was never built.
After the war Soviet officers interrogated both men. Sander was asked why he had done it. In substance he answered: he had been a German engineer and had regarded it as his duty to apply his specialist knowledge in this way in order to help Germany win the war, just as an aircraft engineer in wartime builds aeroplanes that are also connected with the destruction of human beings.
Read that sentence twice. It is not the sentence of a fanatic. It is the sentence of a specialist who has solved his problem and regards the comparison with aircraft construction as an argument. The firm’s former administration building in Erfurt is today a memorial. It does not commemorate murderers. It commemorates engineers.
III. Bread and Gas from the Same Hand
Fritz Haber showed how to fix nitrogen from the air. Without the Haber–Bosch process there would be no synthetic fertiliser, which today feeds roughly half of humanity. The same Fritz Haber directed the first large chlorine gas attack in history at Ypres on 22 April 1915. He considered it his patriotic duty. He received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for 1918 all the same.
Haber was not the last chemist who could do both. Otto Ambros of IG Farben developed synthetic rubber, which the world needed, and with his department the nerve agents sarin and soman, which nobody needed. In 1941 he selected the site for the Buna works near Auschwitz and ran it until the end of the war, with prisoners from the Monowitz camp built specially for the purpose as his workforce. In 1948 he was sentenced in Nuremberg to eight years’ imprisonment. After three years he was free and once again a sought-after adviser: to industry, to the US Army Chemical Corps and to Konrad Adenauer. In 1965 he testified as a witness at the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial: he had visited the plant two or three times a year.
Thomas Midgley, an American mechanical engineer, brilliantly solved two problems in the 1920s. He cured engine knock with tetraethyl lead in petrol, and with chlorofluorocarbons he found non-toxic, non-flammable refrigerants for refrigerators. The first poisoned the children of the cities with lead for decades; the second tore a hole in the ozone layer. The environmental historian John McNeill later wrote that Midgley had more impact on the atmosphere than any other single organism in Earth’s history.
Wernher von Braun wanted to go to the Moon. On the way there he built the V-2. More prisoners died producing it in the underground camp of Mittelbau-Dora than the rocket killed in the war. After the war the Americans brought him over, and he did indeed take them to the Moon.
None of these men was stupid, and none was a monster. Each had a task that gripped him, a client who paid, and a justification that satisfied him. Nothing more is needed.
IV. For Anyone Who Pays
Whoever has once learned to build rockets will build them for anyone who pays him. At the end of 1961, Eugen Sänger, Wolfgang Pilz and Paul Goercke, who had worked at Peenemünde during the war and afterwards at the Stuttgart Research Institute for the Physics of Jet Propulsion, went to Egypt. They recruited some 35 experienced German specialists and built rockets for Gamal Abdel Nasser which, in his words, could hit any point “south of Beirut”. Israel was meant. Israeli intelligence responded with threats, abduction and letter bombs. One of them killed five Egyptian workers in the rocket factory, the people who had least to do with any of it.
Whoever builds machine tools will deliver them to anyone who pays. The English firm Matrix Churchill in Coventry, a maker of high-quality precision machines, had secretly passed into Iraqi ownership in the late 1980s. It supplied machines to Saddam Hussein’s arms factories, where shells and rocket parts were made. In 1992 its directors stood trial in London. The trial collapsed when the former minister Alan Clark admitted that he himself had encouraged the manufacturers to stress the civilian purpose in their export applications. The machines were “dual use”: they can turn a piston or a shell. The machine does not know. The engineer who designs it, installs it and trains the staff usually does.
Whoever can build submarines will also build them for drug cartels. In September 2000, Colombian police found a half-finished submarine about thirty metres long in a warehouse in Facatativá, 2,600 metres up in the Andes. It could have carried up to 200 tonnes of cocaine. The blueprints bore Russian labels, and according to investigators an engineer was involved who had built submarines before. He had found a new task. It was surely technically sweet.
V. Conscience as an Afterthought
When engineers speak about the consequences of their work, it is usually afterwards. In October 1945 Oppenheimer told President Truman that he felt he had blood on his hands – after Hiroshima, not before the first test. Geoffrey Hinton, without whom today’s artificial intelligence would be unthinkable, left Google in May 2023 so that he could warn freely of the dangers of what he himself had helped to build. Aza Raskin, who invented infinite scroll, which means you never reach the end of a page on your phone, later publicly regretted what he had done with it.
One cannot reproach these people for their remorse. But one can note that it always comes too late. The pattern is always the same: first the technical success, then the fame, then the misgivings. The misgivings change nothing any more, because the thing is out in the world, and others carry on building it without misgivings.
VI. Each for Himself
Why is that so? Not because engineers are worse people than others. But because they are alone as soon as the subject is no longer technology.
Technically we work together, and incredibly closely: worldwide, across the boundaries of companies, countries and systems, in a division of labour in which a single component travels through a dozen countries. We have standards, guidelines, conferences and textbooks. We agree on tolerances, test procedures and safety factors. For everything else, however, the rule is: each for himself and God against all.
One sees this most clearly where things go wrong. The defeat device with which Volkswagen made millions of diesel cars clean on the test bench and dirty on the road was not developed by a single villain. Many engineers worked on it over the years, each on his own piece. Each knew enough to know it, or at least to suspect it, and none considered himself responsible for the whole. The first person to go to prison in the United States was an engineer, James Liang, for 40 months. The requirement came from above: a diesel for the American market that would meet the strict limits and still be cheap. How the engineers managed it, nobody up there wanted to know too precisely; what the board members knew and when is still occupying the German courts today. We described this pattern in “Division of Labour”: whoever does only one part need not see the whole, and whoever need not see it does not see it.
A doctor has a medical association, professional law and an oath that tells him he must do no harm. A lawyer has a bar that can take away his licence. An engineer has an employment contract. The Association of German Engineers (VDI) has adopted ethical principles, but there is nobody who determines when they have been violated, and it has consequences for no one. As for the association itself, we showed in “The Unpolitical Association” that in 170 years it has never answered the question of the engineer’s political responsibility.
Whoever is alone has only two options: go along or leave. Whoever leaves is replaced, next Monday, by someone with fewer misgivings. Everybody knows this, and that is why almost nobody leaves. “It was a sweet job”, and the salary was right too. The rest is a shrug.
VII. The Conversion
How fast this happens can be observed in Germany right now. In Görlitz, railway carriages were built for 175 years, most recently double-deck coaches and trams for Alstom. In February 2025 the arms group KNDS agreed to take over the plant. A year later it was producing hulls and turret housings for the Leopard 2 main battle tank and modules for the Boxer wheeled armoured vehicle. Around 580 of the 700 employees were to stay. The same welders, the same designers, the same halls. Since 2022 many automotive suppliers, machine builders and electronics firms have taken the same path.
One may consider this conversion right. A country whose neighbours are threatened needs weapons, and someone has to build them. That is not the point here. The point is that the conversion took place without any visible debate among those who carry it out. Who decides to whom the tanks will later be sold? What happens to the machines and the know-how when the situation changes? Who checks whether a drone controller only defends or also attacks on its own? These questions were asked by demonstrators at the factory gate. The engineers redesigned. The order was there, the money was right, and the task was interesting.
VIII. The Vassals
Engineers have almost never ruled themselves. They have served those who ruled, and in doing so made their power greater than it could ever have become without them. Lewis Mumford showed that even the pyramids were the work of a machine made of people: at the top the pharaoh, below him the scribes and master builders who knew how it was done, and at the very bottom the thousands who hauled. We have described this megamachine in a series of its own. Its pattern has not changed to this day. The technical intelligentsia supplies the know-how, and power and wealth accumulate with those who command it.
In recent years this has become a danger to democracy itself, and one can see it in three examples that could hardly be more different politically.
In Russia, the industrial combines that generations of Soviet engineers had built were handed out to a handful of men in the loans-for-shares auctions of the mid-1990s for a fraction of their value. These men became the oligarchs, and the oligarchs became the foundation of a regime that today merely stages elections.
In China, from 2002 to 2007, the Standing Committee of the Politburo consisted of nine men, all of them engineers by training. The Party did not fight the technical intelligentsia; it put it into service. The cameras and software with which an entire population is surveilled in Xinjiang were developed by Chinese engineers at companies such as Hikvision. The US government placed Hikvision on its sanctions list for this reason in October 2019.
In the United States, thousands of outstanding engineers built the platforms through which a large part of public life now runs. The capital belongs to many, the votes to few. Mark Zuckerberg owns a little over 13 percent of Meta but controls almost 61 percent of the votes. Elon Musk holds a little over 82 percent of the votes at SpaceX and can be removed as chief executive only by a majority that he himself owns. Anthropic too, the company whose model is co-writing this text, secures for its seven founders, through a single share, the majority in every general meeting. Musk spent more than 250 million dollars in the 2024 election campaign. Afterwards a group of young software engineers from his circle, as the “Department of Government Efficiency”, forced their way into the payment systems of the US federal administration, without election, without law and without parliamentary control. As early as 2009 Peter Thiel wrote that he no longer believed freedom and democracy were compatible.
Three systems, one pattern. Whether party, oligarch or founder with special voting rights: the power of those at the top rests on the work of engineers who do not ask. Without them there would be neither the surveillance in Xinjiang nor the platforms nor the data centres. Whoever leaves his skill to the highest bidder should not be surprised when the highest bidder ends up commanding democracy as well.
IX. When They Do Act Together
That it can be otherwise is shown by the rare cases in which specialists appear as a group. In April 1957, eighteen West German nuclear scientists declared under their own names, among them Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, that they would not take part in any way in the production, testing or use of nuclear weapons. The federal government had just raised the idea of arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. The Bundeswehr never received nuclear weapons of its own.
In spring 2018, some 4,000 Google employees signed a letter against Project Maven, with which the Pentagon wanted to use artificial intelligence to analyse drone imagery. About a dozen resigned. Google did not renew the contract and adopted principles under which it would not develop AI for weapons. In February 2025 the company dropped this commitment again, quietly, in a revision of its principles.
Both cases show the same thing. Together, engineers and scientists have a power that no individual has, because eighteen well-known names or 4,000 signatures cannot be replaced next Monday. And both cases show that this power evaporates as soon as the group dissolves again. A declaration is not an institution, and an open letter is not professional law.
Only once did engineers try to organise politically as a profession, and the result was worse than the muddling of each individual. In 1921 the economist Thorstein Veblen argued in “The Engineers and the Price System” that the price system produced waste and that only the engineers, who understood production, could eliminate it. He proposed a “soviet of technicians”. During the Great Depression, Howard Scott turned this into the Technocracy movement: grey uniforms, a salute to the “Chief Engineer”, energy certificates instead of money. In early 1933, at the Hotel Pierre in New York, before 400 listeners and a nationwide radio audience, Scott gave the speech that was to bring the movement its breakthrough. He threw around unsupported figures, lost the thread and made a fool of himself. That did not finish the movement. It lived on as Technocracy Inc., in grey suits and with cars painted grey. In the summer of 1947, in “Operation Columbia”, it drove hundreds of grey cars, trucks and trailers from Los Angeles to Vancouver, with motorcycles as marshals in front and above them a grey aircraft bearing the movement’s symbol on its wings. A Vancouver newspaper spoke of “neo-fascist trappings”. After that the movement lost all significance. Formally it exists to this day.
That is hubris from the other side. When engineers finally joined together, they did not want to take on responsibility but to rule: without election, without parliament, by virtue of their expertise. The idea lives on to this day, in Silicon Valley more than anywhere else; we traced it in “The Engineers of Absolutism”. Between the engineer who feels responsible for nothing outside his narrow field and the engineer who declares himself responsible for everything and wants to take over power, the middle is missing: the engineer who, as a citizen, answers for what he builds and knows what he will not build.
X. What We Write into Our Own Record
We write this into no one’s record but our own. Whoever invents puts things into the world that he can no longer take back. That is the whole responsibility, and it cannot be handed over to the client, the superior or the association.
Three things follow, and none of them is an admonition.
First: The question “what for?” belongs at the beginning of the work, not at the end. Oppenheimer’s order can be reversed. Whoever reverses it will have to turn down many a fine task. That is the price.
Second: Alone, the engineer can be blackmailed; together, he cannot. What the medical association is to doctors, we lack: a body that protects an engineer when he refuses, and that states publicly when he did not refuse although he should have. As long as it does not exist, every refusal remains a personal sacrifice, and few people make personal sacrifices.
Third: The technical and scientific intelligentsia must stop considering itself unpolitical, and must no more consider itself called to govern than let itself be made the vassal of those who want to. Whoever determines what can be built is doing politics, whether he wants to or not. He should do it openly, as a citizen among citizens, and answer for what he has built.
It is comfortable to be a fool. You solve the problem, take the money and leave the consequences to others. But there are no others. The consequences always land on those who built nothing and were never asked.
Further reading: The Unpolitical Association · The Engineers of Absolutism · Division of Labour · War as the Father of All Things? · Technical Intelligence · The Bearers of Technical Intelligence between Hubris and Powerlessness