Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 16 November 2026

The View in the Rear-View Mirror

On a consultancy that recommended to Europe in March what Beijing banned in October

In March, one of the big management consultancies advises European industry to learn from China: less testing on the road, products that are only eighty to ninety per cent finished at start of production, lower requirements for durability. In October, Beijing prescribes the opposite to its carmakers. In between lie fatal accidents.

I. A recipe from March

In March 2026 Roland Berger published a report entitled “China’s cost and speed advantage”, “a wake-up call for Western companies”. The message: Chinese carmakers develop a new vehicle 25 to 30 per cent faster and 20 to 30 per cent more cheaply than European ones, and in other industries the gap is even larger. This, it says, is not a matter of culture but of decisions, and can therefore be copied in Europe “in a slimmed-down version”.

What is to be copied is set out in the report itself. Up to eighty per cent of testing takes place in simulation. Development aims at a “minimum viable product” that reaches the market quickly. The self-assessment at the end names as the goal “two generations in one lifecycle, 80 to 90 per cent readiness at start of production”. Instead of building for a long life, one builds for current demand: “build-to-require” instead of “build-to-last”. And the first item among the cost advantages in the chart on heavy trucks reads: “less durability/reliability requirements”.

The accompanying press release, which the German trade press took over in April, sounds friendlier. There it says that around sixty per cent of the cost advantage comes from standardisation, fewer variants and a design “focused on market-relevant performance”. That sounds like good sense. What the report describes is a car that lasts less long and is finished testing at the customer’s.

II. A regulation from October

On 13 October 2025 in Chengdu, a 31-year-old man drove his Xiaomi SU7 into the back of another car. On impact, the low-voltage electrical system failed. The car’s door handles were flush-mounted and electrically operated; there was no mechanical emergency release on the outside. Passers-by tried to open the doors, later with hammers. The car burned out, and the driver burned to death inside it.

It was not the only case. In crash tests, after a side impact, only 67 per cent of doors with purely electronic handles could be opened; with mechanical handles it was 98 per cent. One driver fell asleep in a reclining seat after switching on the driver assistance system. In this “zero-gravity position”, three-point seat belts barely restrain the occupant; in tests, the risk of serious injury was rated 4.4 times as high as in a normal seating position. In August 2026, nine manufacturers had to recall more than four million cars.

Since early 2026 a mandatory standard has required mechanical door handles. On 10 October 2026 China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, together with three other authorities, published a draft of new approval rules to take effect in January 2027. The ban on concealed door handles is confirmed, foldable screens are banned, lights and wipers must once again be operable by switches, and the reclining function is locked while driving. Above all, before approval a new model must complete at least 30,000 kilometres of reliability testing and be tested for at least a year under changing climatic conditions, in the sequence extreme cold, extreme heat, extreme cold again: “two winters and one summer”. The ministry’s chief engineer said when the rules were presented: “Research and development must always give priority to safety and must never come at its expense.”

The Chinese business press wrote that the rules would make it considerably harder for the industry to bring out a new vehicle generation every year. That, insiders say, is exactly the intention.

III. How one client becomes an industry

One might object that seven months is a long time and that nobody could have foreseen the accidents. But the warning was in the report itself. On page 20, under “Trade-offs in the Chinese model”, it says that shortened testing cycles “sometimes” lead to reliability problems, though these are “becoming less frequent”. By then the Chengdu accident was five months in the past. The consultants knew the risk and dispatched it in a subordinate clause, because it did not fit the recipe.

They treat their own figures just as carelessly. The sixty per cent that appears in the press release as a finding about Chinese industry comes, according to the report, from “a recent project for an automotive client”, and specifically for heavy trucks. The chart gives “interviews with market participants” as its source. The report names no sample, no period of study, no method. The comparison of development times rests on seven manufacturers.

That the advantage is “not primarily” down to wages is said by the press release and by the introduction to the chapter on costs. One page later it says that engineers at SAIC work six days a week from nine in the morning until 11 pm or midnight, that blue-collar wages are around 40 per cent below the EU level, and that captive suppliers deliver at prices with no or minimal margin, supported by state subsidies. Part of the speed that Europe is supposed to achieve through better processes is simply working hours.

IV. The rear-view mirror

The fault lies not with individual consultants but with their tool. Benchmarking measures what someone else did yesterday. By the time it exists as a study, has been sold and implemented in a company, years have passed. The other party has moved on in the meantime, and sometimes it has turned around.

It is an old pattern. After the First World War, France built the Maginot Line, the best possible defence against the war that was over. The fashion retailer who copies last year’s collection puts it in the window at the very moment the trendsetter discards it.

A report on “China speed” is a rear-view mirror sold as a satnav. It can show where someone else has been. Where that someone is turning now, it cannot see, still less where one ought to be going oneself.

V. What is missing from the list

The report ends with an action checklist. It consists of benchmarking development times, teardown analyses of Chinese competitor products, cost comparisons at bill-of-materials level, fewer variants, a “cost-out operating model”, and the advice to create a “burning platform” in one’s own company, that is, a sense of crisis that forces change. On the last page there is a QR code: one is invited to carry out a self-assessment and request a “customized Power Hour”.

What is missing is any trace of the new. On page 20 the report claims that breakthrough innovations still come from the West, from materials research, robotics and software, and that reliability and quality are its long-standing strengths. Yet the checklist contains nothing that would produce or protect an invention. It recommends lowering durability, precisely the strength the report still grants the West. The advice to Europe is to dismantle its own advantages in order to resemble a competitor that is busy acquiring Europe’s advantages.

This is no accident but the business model we described in Palliative Consulting. A repeatable method gets paid for, whether or not anything new comes of it in the end. A teardown analysis can be sold to every client; an invention only once, and only at a risk. How an institution in this way comes to take its own operation for its purpose is shown in The General Standard.

VI. What consulting is good for

Fairness requires this too: whoever takes a competitor’s product apart and recalculates it part by part is doing real work. Knowing where one stands is better than not knowing. The report’s finding that Europe’s lag has more to do with decisions, committees and the multiplicity of variants than with wages is uncomfortable and probably right at its core.

But that is information about the present, not the future. The future comes into being where someone does something that does not yet exist and therefore appears in no benchmark. For that, consulting has no tool, and it cannot have one, because its raw material is what others have already done.

Whoever follows the one in front never arrives ahead of him. In this case not even where he wanted to go, because the one in front has since turned back.

Read on: Palliative Consulting · The General Standard · From Both Shelves

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 16 November 2026.

Sources. Roland Berger, “China’s cost and speed advantage. A wake-up call for Western companies”, March 2026 (authors incl. Oliver Knapp, Lukas Hofmann, Michael Zhao), in particular pp. 5, 11–13, 17–18, 20, 24–26; press release “China Speed Light in Europa möglich”, Munich, 13 March 2026. · “China Speed Light auch in Europa möglich”, Vogel Communications Group, 1 April 2026. · Henrik Bork, “Peking drückt beim ‚China Speed’ auf die Bremse”, China Market Insider (Vogel Communications Group), 13 November 2026, citing Renmin Ribao, Caixin, CnEVPost, Global Times and Zhongguo Jingyingwang. · Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the PRC et al., “Notice on Further Strengthening the Management of Innovative Automotive Product Design and Research, Development, Testing and Validation (Draft for Public Comment)”, 10 October 2026; reports in CnEVPost, 10 October 2026, and Gasgoo Auto News, October 2026.