Designing Against the Saboteur
What the inventive method TRIZ teaches about protecting democracy
Addendum to: The Legal Seizure of Power
In January we described the design flaws that make a legal seizure of power possible, and we closed with the sentence that almost none of them will be changed. An engineer would not stop at that point. He would start there.
I. The driver who falls asleep
In railway cabs there is a switch the driver has to press at short intervals. If he does not, because he has fallen asleep or had a heart attack, the train brakes on its own. The safety of the train does not depend on the driver being awake and well-meaning. It depends on his having to prove it.
Older still is the air brake that George Westinghouse patented in 1872. In it, the pressure in the line holds the brakes open. If a car breaks loose and the hose tears with it, the pressure drops and the whole train brakes. The fault leads into the safe state, not into disaster.
The American Constitution is built the other way round. In our essay on the legal seizure of power we quoted James Madison: if men were angels, no government would be necessary. And we concluded that the Constitution works only if the actors want it to work. In the language of the inventive method TRIZ, which the Soviet engineer Genrich Altshuller distilled from tens of thousands of patents, that is a poor ideal state. The system needs an outside helper, good will, and when the helper fails, the system fails with him. The ideal final result would be the opposite: an order that protects itself, even against those who operate it.
II. Firm and flexible at once
At the core of the problem lies a contradiction. The rules of a democracy must be firm, so that those in power cannot bend them in their own favour. And they must be flexible, so that their faults can be repaired. The United States chose firm. A constitutional amendment needs two thirds in both chambers of Congress and the consent of three quarters of the states. That is why the faults we listed in January stayed where they were.
In TRIZ, such a contradiction is not resolved by a compromise in which both sides lose, but by separation, as we described in “The Construction of Mercy”. One separates the two properties in time, by condition, by object. Applying this to the weak points, one finds that for almost every one of them a solution already exists somewhere. It has simply never been regarded as an invention.
III. Separation in time
Whoever changes a rule should not profit from the change himself. The simplest means to that end is delay: the rule changes, but only later, when no one knows any longer whom it will benefit.
The oldest example comes from Madison himself. In 1789 he proposed an amendment under which a raise in congressional pay could take effect only after the next election. It was ratified only in 1992, as the 27th Amendment, more than two hundred years later. The idea can be carried over to elections. Since 2002 the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended that the fundamental elements of electoral law, that is the electoral system itself, the membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, not be changed in the last year before an election. As a more flexible solution, it suggests writing into the constitution that if the electoral law is amended, the old one still applies to the next election.
What happens when this separation is missing, the United States demonstrated in 2025. Districts there are normally redrawn every ten years after the census. At the urging of the White House, Texas redrew its districts in the middle of the decade to give the Republicans five additional seats in the House of Representatives. California answered in November 2025 with a referendum that set aside its independent redistricting commission for the elections up to 2030 and shifted five seats in the other direction. Other states followed. Without separation in time, every rule becomes a weapon, and every weapon calls forth its counter-weapon.
There is a solution of this kind for the Supreme Court as well. For years it has been proposed that justices be appointed for eighteen years, with terms staggered so that every president appoints exactly two justices per term. The composition of the court would then no longer depend on the accident of deaths.
Time, however, can also be used as a weapon. In 2011 Hungary lowered the retirement age for judges, prosecutors and notaries from seventy to sixty-two, with a short transition period. Hundreds of experienced judges had to leave in 2012. The Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional in July 2012, the European Court of Justice declared it incompatible with EU law in November 2012. It did not bring the judges back into office. The counter-action came, but it came too late.
IV. Separation by condition
Emergency powers must be strong, or they will not help in an emergency. And they must be weak, or they become the normal state. The solution is a power that applies only under a condition and expires by itself unless someone renews it. That is the Westinghouse brake of politics: silence means the end, not continuation.
The Roman Republic knew this. Its dictator had almost unlimited power in an emergency, but for six months at most. The South African Constitution of 1996, written by people who had lived under the apartheid state’s states of emergency, goes further. A state of emergency lasts at most 21 days. Parliament can extend it by no more than three months at a time, the first time by a simple majority, thereafter only with sixty per cent of the members and only after a public debate. Every extension is more expensive than the last. Abuse becomes harder with each step instead of easier.
The Weimar Constitution had a brake, but it was installed wrongly. Under Article 48 the Reichstag could demand that an emergency decree of the Reich President be revoked. On 18 July 1930 it did exactly that, against the decree with which Chancellor Brüning wanted to force through his budget. On the same day Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag, relying on Article 25. The brake existed. But the one who was to be braked could switch it off by sending the brakeman home. A designer would say: two functions that are meant to check each other must not lie in the same hand.
V. Destroying only together with building
The Basic Law of 1949 turned this experience into a genuine invention, even if it is rarely called one. The constructive vote of no confidence under Article 67 allows the Bundestag to bring down a chancellor, but only by electing a new one in the same act. In Weimar, National Socialists and Communists could agree to bring down a government without having to agree on anything else. After 1949 that is impossible. Whoever wants to destroy must build at the same time.
In the United States the pardon power lacks such a coupling. The president there can also pardon pre-emptively, before any charge has been brought. On 20 January 2025, his first day in office, Donald Trump pardoned some 1,500 people charged over the storming of the Capitol, including some who had attacked police officers, and had the pending cases dropped. Shortly before, Joe Biden had pre-emptively pardoned people he saw as threatened by his successor. On self-pardon there is only an opinion of the Justice Department of 5 August 1974, four days before Nixon’s resignation. It rejects it on the strength of an old legal principle: no one may be a judge in his own case. This has never been tested in court.
That legal principle is itself already a separation, namely by person. In Germany it is built into the pardon power in a different way: the Federal President may not intervene in pending criminal proceedings. Clemency comes only after a court has spoken. That is a separation in time, and it prevents precisely what happened on 20 January 2025.
VI. What is already there
With every problem, TRIZ first asks about the resources that already exist in the system and cost nothing. The best-known political example is the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. The American Constitution leaves it to each state how it appoints its electors. The members of the compact commit themselves to give their electors to the candidate who received the most votes nationwide, as soon as the members together reach the majority of 270 electors. The Electoral College is thus not abolished but bypassed, without a constitutional amendment. So far 18 states and the capital, Washington, have joined, most recently Virginia in April 2026. Together they have 222 electors. For the compact to take effect, further states with a combined 48 electors must join.
The solution has two weaknesses, and we name them. So far only states governed by Democrats have joined, and whether the compact is valid without the consent of Congress will in the end be decided by the courts. But it is not built to favour a party. Had it already applied in 2024, all member states would have given their votes to Trump, because he also won the nationwide majority.
A second resource is less conspicuous. In the United States, elections are run not centrally but by thousands of officials in states and counties. On 2 January 2021 Trump demanded on the telephone that Georgia’s chief election official, Brad Raffensperger, a Republican, “find 11,780 votes”, one more than Biden’s margin. Raffensperger refused. Whoever takes over a central authority has the result in his hands. Whoever wants to falsify a distributed election must break hundreds of people, and each of them can say no.
VII. The inversion
In the 1980s Boris Zlotin and Alla Zusman developed from TRIZ a method that later became known as Anticipatory Failure Determination. Its core is a simple inversion. One does not ask: how do we prevent the system from failing? One asks: how would I go about making it fail? Whoever puts himself in the saboteur’s place finds weak points the well-meaning designer overlooks, because he looks at his system only the way it is meant to be.
At the end of our January essay stands the question of what weak points our own systems have. The Bundestag once actually asked it with the eyes of the saboteur. Until 2024, the number of constitutional judges, their term of office and the division of the court into two senates were laid down only in an ordinary statute that any majority could change. A government wanting to paralyse the court would have had an easy time of it, as happened in Poland after 2015. In December 2024 the Bundestag and Bundesrat wrote these rules into the Basic Law and cleared the way for a substitute election mechanism: if one of the two electing bodies blocks the election of judges, the other can elect.
Thuringia lacks such a mechanism, and there one sees what the inversion finds. Since the 2024 election the AfD has held 32 of 88 seats there, more than a third. Wherever the state constitution requires a two-thirds majority, it can block, including in filling the judicial selection committee, without which no judges can be appointed for life. It has tied the blockade to demands, for instance for a seat on the commission that oversees telephone surveillance. In April 2025 an AfD politician was elected a deputy member of the state constitutional court for the first time, with the required two thirds. Since autumn 2025 judicial appointments have gone through the committees in their old composition, on the strength of a legal opinion, a makeshift solution at the edge of what the constitution allows.
Here a further contradiction appears that the authors of the state constitution did not see. The two-thirds majority was meant to protect the minority against the majority. As soon as a party that does not want to preserve the institutions holds more than a third, it protects that party against all others and turns its veto into a pledge. The federal solution shows the pattern: a supermajority that, after a deadline, can be replaced by another route. Again a separation in time. Thuringia can introduce it only with the votes of those against whom it would be directed.
VIII. The limit
TRIZ is a method for systems whose purpose all participants share. Engineers fight friction, wear and chance, not an opponent who designs along with them. In politics it is different. Every invention can be turned around, as Hungary showed with the retirement age and Texas with the drawing of districts. A constitution is therefore never finished. It must be read continually with the eyes of the saboteur, by people who are not saboteurs themselves.
It also follows from the analysis that design does not replace the people our January essay speaks of at its end. Raffensperger was not a mechanism, he was a person. But design can make courage cheaper. An official who says no needs a rule to stand on, and a power that expires by itself needs no one to stand in its way. In “The Construction of Mercy” the rule was to build the bill so that mercilessness costs more than mercy. Here it is to build the order so that abuse costs more than loyalty.
Further reading: The Legal Seizure of Power · The Construction of Mercy · Negative Feedback Returns · Apocalypse – Now?