Negative Feedback Returns
What a Congress can do against a President, and what that means for Europe
In the night of 4 November 2026 the Republicans lost both chambers of the American Congress. Many in Europe will breathe a sigh of relief. Before they do, a sober look at what a Congress can and cannot do is worthwhile.
I. The night
On election night the Associated Press called both chambers for the Democrats. In the Senate they gained at least seven seats, in Iowa, Kansas, Ohio, Texas, South Carolina, North Carolina and Maine. In Maine Susan Collins, a senator since 1997, conceded defeat. In the House of Representatives the Democrats reached the necessary 218 seats in the early morning hours, while around 90 races were still open. Even in states such as Kansas and South Carolina they did markedly better than their presidential candidate in 2024.
A control engineer would say: the sensor has responded. For two years a President whose party held both chambers governed practically without a counterweight in Congress. Now negative feedback returns. The question is how strong it is.
II. What Congress can do
Imagine a supervisory board that is suddenly filled with the opponents of the management board. It cannot run the company. But it can refuse money, demand files and block personnel decisions. That is roughly how the new Congress stands towards the President.
From 3 January 2027 Trump needs the consent of the Democrats for every law and every budget. The committees of both chambers can subpoena witnesses and demand files. The Senate must confirm ministers, ambassadors and federal judges, and it can reject them. That is perhaps the most important lever, for a President governs through the people he appoints.
For Europe there is a provision that has applied since December 2023. At that time Congress decided in the defence budget that a President may not leave NATO without the consent of two thirds of the Senate or a law of its own. With a Democratic Senate this bolt is now more secure than ever.
III. What it cannot do
Trump remains President until January 2029. He keeps his veto. To override a veto, Congress needs two thirds of the votes in both chambers, and for a conviction in an impeachment trial the Senate needs 67 votes. As of the morning after the election, the Democrats have 53.
Foreign policy remains largely in the hands of the President, as does the use of the military and most of trade policy. How agile a President is in this was shown by the year 2026. On 20 February the Supreme Court ruled by six votes to three that the tariffs Trump had based on an emergency law were unlawful. The administration immediately switched to other laws and imposed new tariffs. Whoever closes a door must expect the other to find a window.
IV. What history shows
Two examples from the recent past make the limits tangible.
In 2006 the Democrats won both chambers, above all because of the Iraq war. In January 2007 President Bush announced he would send additional troops to Iraq. In the spring Congress passed a timetable for withdrawal, Bush vetoed it, and in the end Congress approved the money for the war without a timetable. A majority that does not want to cut the money for soldiers in the field cannot end a war.
In 2018 the Democrats won the House of Representatives. In December 2019 they impeached Trump; in February 2020 the Senate acquitted him. The investigation made much public. It prevented nothing.
V. The two months in between
The new Congress only convenes on 3 January 2027. Until then the old one remains in office, with Republican majorities in both chambers. Whatever a government still wants to push through before losing power, it pushes through in such weeks: appointments, budget decisions, decrees. Anyone in Europe now hoping for quick changes will see little of them before January.
VI. What this means for Europe
The greatest danger of this night lies not in Washington but in the European capitals. It consists in reading the election as a return to the old order and letting their own efforts fall asleep again.
The demand that Europe do more for its defence is not Trump’s invention. Barack Obama already called the Europeans “free riders” in 2016. A Democratic Congress, too, will expect Europe to pay, and it will be glad to see Europe buy American while doing so. We described in “The Protection Racket” how the Pentagon threatened the EU in February 2026 should it favour its own arms industry. This interest is not tied to a party but to an industry.
What can change is the tone and the reliability. A Senate that must confirm ambassadors and protects NATO membership makes Washington more predictable. No more. The dependencies we described in “The Vassal” and “The Eight” remain: in weapons, software, satellites and money.
VII. What follows
Negative feedback through elections is slow. It reports every two years, and between two measurements the system runs as it runs. In between there remain the courts, as in February with the tariff ruling, and the public. That is better than no negative feedback, but it is not a control on which another continent should rely.
For Europe the lesson is therefore the same as before the election. Whoever makes his security depend on how American voters in Kansas and Maine vote has no controller of his own. He only has the hope that the foreign one is well tuned. This time the hope held. That is a reason for relief, not for an all-clear.
Further reading: The Vassal · The Eight · The Protection Racket · What Europe Can Do Now