Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 17 November 2026, updated 18 November 2026

Drop by Drop

How cocaine money in Colombia becomes usurious loans for small traders – and where on its way it touches Europe

Down below, young men on motorbikes collect the interest from small traders every day. Up above, a German bank processes billions for Colombian banks. In between lies a cycle in which money never runs short.

I. The daily visit

In Colombia it is called “gota a gota”, drop by drop. It means loans from private individuals at extremely high interest that have to be repaid daily. Those who do not pay must expect violence, up to and including murder. The money comes fast, without paperwork, without guarantors, without questions. It goes to people no bank would ever serve: the woman with the fruit stall, the man who mends shoes, the little shop on the corner.

The organisations behind it consist of administrators, collectors and “security chiefs”. The collectors ride motorbikes and pick up the interest every day. The security chiefs come when someone falls behind. The daily visit has two purposes. It keeps the money flowing. And it reminds the debtor every day that they know where he is.

II. The arithmetic

Interest runs at 20 to 40 percent a month, up to 696 percent a year. The legal maximum rate in Colombia is just under 29 percent a year. According to figures from the association of Colombian microfinance institutions, around ten million Colombians are paying off such loans at more than 700 percent a year. Borrow 100,000 pesos, and within a year you pay more than 700,000 pesos in interest.

One victim describes how people fall into the trap: she borrowed ten million pesos at 20 percent and paid two million every month. “You think you can pay it, but it is unpayable.” An expert in Costa Rica describes the final stage: even those who have repaid everything including interest after three months are still made to pay, because the collectors know where they live.

The scale is not marginal. According to a survey by the statistics office DANE, one in four micro-businesses in Colombia was financed through gota a gota. Only 30 percent had access to a bank loan. In Medellín the districts of Manrique, Villahermosa, Candelaria and San Javier are the hardest hit.

III. Where the money comes from

Gota a gota spread in Medellín and other parts of Colombia in the 1990s, together with the boom in cocaine production and export. Cocaine brought a great deal of money into the country, and usurious loans became a way of laundering it. The Colombian police units Gaula and Dijín have found that many lenders obtain their capital from money laundering and drug trafficking.

That answers the question of whether this is about laundering or about profit. It is about both. InSight Crime, a foundation that investigates organised crime in Latin America, writes that such loans allow criminal groups to launder the proceeds of other illegal activities in a way that earns them further profits. Laundering drug money normally costs a share of it. In gota a gota it multiplies while being laundered.

As financiers, InSight Crime names above all armed groups from the drug trade, among them the Oficina de Envigado and the Clan del Golfo. Cocaine money, in its analysis, gives the cartels “a big bank to lend from”.

How big that bank is, Pablo Escobar’s brother Roberto, who kept the books of the Medellín cartel, described long ago. By his account the cartel spent 1,000 dollars a week just on rubber bands to bundle the stacks of cash. Because it had more cash than it could deposit in banks, it stored the bundles in warehouses and wrote off ten percent every year because the rats came at night. Whether his figures are exact, nobody can check. The picture is right: the cartels never lack money. What they lack is a place where it lies clean and multiplies.

Not every lender is a cartel. The anthropologist María Fernanda Palomino-Martínez studied moneylenders in Palmira in the Valle del Cauca. She describes gota a gota as a web that, though illegal, is deeply rooted in people’s habits and material needs. For all their coercion, the lenders offer something the formal financial system does not adequately provide. That, too, is part of the truth: gota a gota lives off a gap the banks leave open.

IV. The pyramid

The United Nations examined the networks in Costa Rica and found four levels: the owners of the capital, the people who lend it, a network for logistics and support, and finally the collectors.

The collectors, too, start out in debt. In Uruguay, where Colombian groups control the business, the recruited migrants must repay the bosses for the flight from Colombia, their lodging and their starting capital. Only then are they “free”. Many have a police or military background. Debt is the principle of the whole system, from the small trader to the man on the motorbike.

V. An export hit

Since the 1990s gota a gota has spread across almost all of Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the journalist network Connectas, it can be found in at least 16 countries.

In the case “La expansión del gota a gota”, Guatemala’s public prosecutor described a network with around 100,000 debtors in Mexico, Argentina, Honduras, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Paraguay, Ecuador and Guatemala. The loans, it said, are merely a front for moving large sums of money. Part of the laundering was coordinated from Colombian prisons.

In El Salvador the authorities arrested around 110 people, most of them Colombians. According to Justice Minister Gustavo Villatoro, the “gota a gota structure” originated in the Colombian cartels in 1998. He gave the more than 400 Colombians still working illegally in the country for the structure 72 hours to leave.

VI. The other half of the cycle

The capital for gota a gota comes from cocaine, and much of the cocaine is sold in Europe. In February 2026 Spain’s Guardia Civil and the Colombian police arrested one of the Clan del Golfo’s most important financial operators in Medellín. His network is said to have brought more than 120 tonnes of cocaine a year to Europe.

How the money flows back is shown by the same operation, “Gulupa”. The drug money arrived as cash in Mexico, the Emirates or Germany, was converted into cryptocurrency and reappeared clean in corporate accounts. The Guardia Civil considered these people “possibly the most powerful active drug traffickers in the world”.

Every link in this chain is documented on its own: cocaine is sold in Europe. The cash is laundered, among other places, in Germany. It flows to the Clan del Golfo. And the Clan del Golfo is among the most important financiers of gota a gota. Whether exactly this money reaches the traders in Manrique is not documented. That is our conclusion, and we label it as such. On this reading, the German share in the cycle is not an investor. It is the German cocaine customer.

VII. The bank that did not look

Gota a gota launders small sums in cash. The large ones need banks. Since today we know how one German bank dealt with Colombian money.

Under the code name “Project Cali”, Deutsche Bank investigated its Colombia business internally. In 2019 alone it processed more than 171,000 transactions worth over 20 billion euros for Colombian banks. According to its own records it filed not a single money-laundering report on this business with the German authorities that year, and fewer than ten with the American ones. Together with its nine partner banks, around 60 percent of all Colombian euro payments thus ran through Deutsche Bank. When the financial supervisor BaFin announced in August 2018 that it would scrutinise the bank over money laundering, the bank still had around 25,000 unwanted clients on its books, among them alleged drug barons from Colombia.

What this looked like in a single case is shown by a company from Cali. It declared annual revenue of 169,000 dollars for 2019. In the same year it sent 29 million dollars around the world through the bank, in eleven transfers and within two months. None of them was stopped. Part of the money flagged by Project Cali went into Colombia’s webcam industry, in which women offer sexual services by livestream and in which, according to Human Rights Watch, exploitation occurs again and again. The two lawyers whom the New York financial regulator had installed in the bank as monitors wrote in September 2020 that with Project Cali the bank had for the first time examined its correspondent banking business itself “and found a veritable swamp”. Its staff, “as in the Epstein case”, had at first shown little interest in the possibility of human trafficking. In November 2020 the bank filed 230 suspicious activity reports after the fact, among other things on drug trafficking, sanctions, shell companies and tax havens. In October 2026 BaFin again found that the bank’s transaction monitoring still has deficiencies.

The bank does not dispute the authenticity of the data. It says many of the cases date back years and were dealt with together with the supervisory authorities. From 2019 to 2025 it says it invested seven billion euros in its controls. Today, it says, it is “a different bank”. What to make of that sentence we described in “We Are a Different Bank Now”.

What has been published so far shows no link between Deutsche Bank’s transactions and gota a gota. We do not speculate about one.

VIII. Above and below

What can be shown is a pattern. The money the cartels earn needs two things: a place where it becomes clean, and one where it multiplies. Down below, the man on the motorbike does this, drop by drop, among people no bank has ever served. Up above, correspondent banks do it, billion by billion, for clients nobody looked at closely.

The woman trader in Medellín gets no bank loan because she cannot prove an income. She pays 700 percent interest to people whose capital comes from cocaine. The Colombian banks that will not lend to her are at the same time moving billions of euros through Frankfurt. And in Frankfurt, in 2019, not a single suspicion was reported to the German authorities.

Both levels earn from the same principle. The collector charges high interest because he lends to people no bank will lend to. The correspondent bank can charge higher fees for countries considered risky. Ulrich Göres, Deutsche Bank’s chief money-laundering officer until 2016, says that as a rule, the greater the risk, the greater the return.

Below, every peso is collected. Above, nothing was reported.

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 17 November 2026, updated 18 November 2026.

Sources. Term and how it works: Portafolio; Pulzo/Noticias RCN (structure in Bogotá); La República, “El círculo vicioso de los préstamos en el gota a gota”, 11.3.2025. · Interest and prevalence: Minuto60, 11.11.2026 (Asomicrofinanzas); Portafolio (legal maximum rate 28.79 percent); Noticias RCN, “Empeñados”, 31.7.2024; La Silla Vacía (DANE survey of micro-businesses); Observador CR (Costa Rica). · Origin and laundering: El Financiero (Costa Rica); La República, “Gota a gota Colombia”; InSight Crime, “Colombian Crime Groups Export Loan Sharking to Peru” and “Latin America’s Criminal Bankers”. · Roberto Escobar (with David Fisher), The Accountant’s Story, New York 2009, according to the publisher’s description (Hachette). · María Fernanda Palomino-Martínez, “Ni mucho ni a todo el mundo: la economía moral de un gota a gota”, Revista Colombiana de Antropología 61/3, 2025; eadem, Prestar y deber, doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona. · UN report on Costa Rica: Observador CR; CRHoy, 23.1.2026. Uruguay: La República. · Export: InSight Crime (Connectas: 16 countries); Prensa Libre (Guatemala, “La expansión del gota a gota”); Teletica (El Salvador). · Operation Gulupa: Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 20.2.2026; Decrypt. · Inside Deutsche Bank: web.de (Project Cali); Trending Topics; 20 Minuten; ad-hoc-news/dpa (bank’s statement); ZDFheute; Der Standard, “Etwas läuft schief”, 18.11.2026 (Skayenz, US monitors, Göres, BaFin); Financial Mail, 17.11.2026 (number of suspicious activity reports 2019 and 2020).