We Are a Different Bank Now
What Deutsche Bank knew internally and how it renamed its own alarms
Fifteen million internal Deutsche Bank documents have been in the hands of more than fifty newsrooms since 17 November 2026. They do not show that the bank’s controls failed. They show that they worked and were overruled. An addendum to “Das Systemprodukt” (in German).
I. The fuse that tripped
In “Das Systemprodukt” we described in February five fuses that could have stopped an impostor. The first was the financial world. At the time we knew that Deutsche Bank had lent Donald Trump more than 2.5 billion dollars over two decades, when no Wall Street bank would touch him any more. We did not know what happened inside the bank.
Now we do. Two employees copied internal records and handed them to the US Department of Justice and to two journalists, Josy Joseph from India and Khadija Sharife from South Africa. Since the spring, more than 200 journalists from over 40 countries have analysed them, in the German-speaking world among others for Der Spiegel, ZDF and the Vienna daily Der Standard. They include more than nine million emails, plus presentations, calendars and minutes. Most come from the departments that decide whether a risky client stays or goes.
On 21 August 2014 Deutsche Bank reported three suspicious transfers to a company called DT Marks Baku LLC to the US authorities. The money came from clients of the Estonian branch of Danske Bank, which later became the centre of one of Europe’s largest money laundering scandals. Further reports followed in 2017 and 2019. They concerned payments from companies the bank itself linked to the “Azerbaijani Laundromat”, a network through which billions were channelled out of Azerbaijan. One of these companies, Faberlex, features prominently in the penalty notice with which the Frankfurt public prosecutor fined the bank 13.5 million euros in 2020 in the Danske case. One report also mentions money from Russian networks flowing to two Trump companies. How solid that lead was, the documents leave open.
DT Marks Baku belonged to Trump’s planned tower in Baku. The bank named the company in its reports. It did not name the owner. In April 2019 it recorded internally: “The bank is not aware of any bank-related connections between President Trump and Russia.”
So the fuse had tripped, for five years. It simply was not connected to the switch that mattered.
II. One word for another
In March 2017, a few weeks after Trump took office, a bank employee sent an accountant in Maine a link. It was meant to contain the tax forms of a single client. It contained the forms for 1,586 accounts, three of them Trump’s. They were not full tax returns but statements of interest and investment income. Still, they were Trump’s financial data, at a time when all of America was looking for them. Shortly before, the bank had set up a dedicated protection project for exactly this data, with a vault and encrypted transmission. It was called “Novus Ordo”, new order.
The in-house lawyer first spoke of a significant data protection breach. Then the “personal privacy breach” became, internally, a “digital unit release”. With the new name, in the bank’s assessment, the obligation to inform the affected clients fell away. A senior manager called it a “brilliant outcome”. Christian Sewing, then on the management board and today its chairman, replied to the decision not to inform Trump with one word: “Ok.”
In the same year, 2017, Sewing wrote the sentence most quoted from the leak in an internal email: KYC was breaking the bank’s revenue neck. KYC stands for Know Your Customer, a bank’s duty to know its clients.
The same pattern appears a third time. In autumn 2017 a service provider discovered that hackers, presumably working for the Chinese state, had been moving for months through a network holding 33,000 of the bank’s servers. The bank concluded internally that it had been “not well prepared”. External experts lacked the tools and data for a proper analysis. The bank did not inform its clients because there was no evidence their data had been taken. Whoever cannot look finds no evidence.
III. The press as the control body
Jeffrey Epstein became a Deutsche Bank client in 2013 after JPMorgan dropped him. He had been a convicted sex offender since 2008. An internal report shows that when it took him on, the bank also knew of further allegations. It put his wealth at more than a billion and expected two to four million dollars a year in revenue.
Over the following years, transactions of around 580 million dollars ran through more than forty accounts, which the bank itself later reported as suspicious, in 21 suspicious activity reports. From the account of a company that was supposed to cover the costs of his private island, payments went to women with Eastern European-sounding names. The bank later found itself that this alone would have been reason to act.
It acted when the Miami Herald reported on Epstein’s victims in the autumn of 2018. The internal review states more than once: “Without negative press this would probably not have been reported.” After the termination, Epstein’s relationship manager wrote to two other institutions on bank letterhead that he was aware of “no problems” with the accounts. He had been involved in the termination and knew of the suspicious payments. The bank closed the last accounts on 9 July 2019, three days after Epstein’s arrest. A confidential report later stated that there might be further cases “of Epstein’s magnitude” among its clients.
That is the real message of the leak, and the bank delivers it itself: its most effective control was not its own department but the newspaper. Frederik Obermaier, one of the journalists involved, admitted on Der Standard’s podcast that the press, too, prefers to report the bank’s record profits rather than the at least four searches this year. At the end of January 2026 prosecutors searched the bank over a late money laundering report, immediately before the press conference at which Sewing presented excellent annual results and a share buyback. If the newspaper is the only control body that works, and it too looks away, none is left. That is our conclusion, not the leak’s.
IV. Voting until it fits
Where the bank’s experts said no, the voting went on.
In 2013 the bank turned down 650 million euros of financing for René Benko’s Signa. The refusal was to serve at the 2014 annual press conference as proof of a change in culture: “Exactly the kind of examples we were looking for.” In 2017 a meeting with Benko was in Sewing’s calendar. In 2018 Sewing asked where the client review stood and was told that expanding the relationship was not possible “with a completely clear conscience”. On 4 November 2019 the reputational risk committee voted: five for, four against. Because the required two-thirds majority was missing, the management board decided. It took on Signa Prime eight days later. Four years after that, Signa was insolvent.
In the Russia business more was at stake. In 2020 two lawyers monitoring the bank on behalf of the US authorities recommended that the bank “urgently consider” closing its Russia business entirely. In the same year a new strategy was put to the board to expand business with existing clients, including Russian super-rich. In April 2021 the board approved it. In May 2021 an internal presentation called a project of the petrochemical group Sibur “the most significant transaction in this sector this decade”. With Sibur the bank repeatedly waived proper proof of who stood behind the group. At the end of 2021, when NATO was already warning its members of the worst, the bank opened a new office in Moscow. Its own compliance department had advised it in 2014 to part with Oleg Deripaska. Deripaska’s company remained a client until 2022.
Two weeks after the invasion of Ukraine, Sewing said a complete withdrawal from Russia would “contradict our values”. The next day he announced the withdrawal. When the US authorities then asked which accounts sanctioned Russians held, the bank reported only companies more than half owned by oligarchs. The Moscow office is still open.
V. The chronicle of promises
After every scandal the bank declared that it had changed. Next to each declaration an internal document can now be placed.
| Year | What the bank said | What happened internally |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Change in culture, proven by the refusal of Benko | In 2019 the board takes on Signa Prime after a 5:4 vote |
| 2018 | The bank should become “a bit more boring” and produce “fewer headlines” | In 2017 a data breach becomes a “digital unit release”; in 2019 Trump’s connections to Russia are “not known” |
| 2020 | Lessons learned from the Epstein case | “Without negative press this would probably not have been reported”; further cases of his magnitude are feared |
| 2021 | New Moscow office as a “commitment” to the Russian market | In 2020 the US monitors had recommended withdrawal; the board decided to expand |
| 2022 | A withdrawal would contradict “our values” | Withdrawal one day later |
| 2026 | “We are a different bank today” | The Moscow office is open |
The sentence in the last row is not new. In September 2020 another international investigative network published the FinCEN Files, including records of more than a hundred internal warnings about the Moscow mirror trades between 2012 and 2015. A team from the audit division, then headed by Sewing, had given the Moscow office a clean bill of health although it could not even produce a list of its clients. The bank said Sewing had not been personally involved. A bank spokesperson’s answer at the time: “We are a different bank now.” Six years later it says the same sentence.
The bank answered the consortium’s extensive questions, mostly not on individual cases. It says Sewing’s emails were quoted selectively and partly from separate threads. It is legitimate, it says, to align checks with the risk of each business. Between 2019 and 2025 it invested seven billion euros in its controls. Many events lie years back and were dealt with together with the authorities at the time. It “firmly rejects” any suggestion of helping clients evade sanctions. René Benko is presumed innocent in the ongoing proceedings. The investigation was co-funded among others by foundations, several governments and the European Commission. According to the media involved, the funders had no access to the data.
VI. The third version
In “The General Standard” we described three versions of a standard that displaces the purpose of an institution. The third reads: whatever sustains the institution is right. At this stage no one applies a standard any more. The institution does what it has always done.
Deutsche Bank shows what this looks like in daily life. No one has to break a rule. It is enough to rename a breach, to file a report without the decisive name, to repeat a vote that found no majority one floor higher, and to read a request from the supervisor so that it asks for less. Each of these steps can be defended on its own. Together they make a bank that hears its own alarms and takes them for noise.
In “Bande von Betrügern” (in German) we described the scandals of German corporations not as accidents but as an operating system. The leak provides the inside view, and not from the time before Sewing but from his. Why such a bank must not fail is set out in “The Legislative Lobby”.
In February we wrote that the fuses had blown. That was too kind. They were renamed.
Further reading: Das Systemprodukt (German) · Bande von Betrügern (German) · The General Standard · The Legislative Lobby