Who Pays for the Cannonball
The German Council of Economic Experts' annual report and the bill for rearmament on credit
Addendum to: Münchhausen's Heirs
In “Münchhausen’s Heirs” we asked who will repay the debts for rearmament and concluded: “Today there is no answer, only silence.” Now the German Council of Economic Experts has answered.
I. The gap
On 11 November 2026 the German Council of Economic Experts, known in Germany as the “economic wise men”, handed its annual report to Chancellor Merz. Fiscal policy faces a consolidation task “of historic proportions”. The chair, Monika Schnitzer: “There is a mismatch between revenue and spending. It will demand hard decisions from politicians.”
The cause is the constitutional amendment of March 2025. Since then, defence spending counts against the debt brake only up to one per cent of economic output; everything above that may be financed on credit, without a ceiling and without an end. If it stays that way, the debt ratio will rise to almost 100 per cent of economic output by 2040, according to the Council’s calculations. In 2040 the federal budget will then lack between 175 and 300 billion euros, depending on how quickly credit financing is scaled back. Schnitzer: “Financing defence spending permanently through additional debt is not sustainable.”
The Council proposes raising the threshold by 0.25 percentage points every year from 2031, until defence is again paid for from the regular budget, and writing this into the Basic Law. A majority for it is not in sight.
II. The list
Then comes the list of how the gap is to be closed. It has to be read for whom it hits.
On pensions, the most recent decisions are to be reversed: the floor on the pension level and the extension of the “mothers’ pension” for child-rearing. The pension without deductions for people with especially long contribution records, the “pension at 63”, is to be abolished. It is available to people who have paid contributions for 45 years, almost always people who started an apprenticeship at fifteen or sixteen. Schnitzer: “Certain decisions can only be taken now, otherwise it is too late.”
Among tax concessions, the reduced VAT rate for restaurant meals, overnight stays, cultural services and animal products is to go, as is the concession for diesel. Joint taxation of married couples is to be replaced by a limited form of income splitting. The company car privilege is to be reformed and the tax exemption for private property sales after ten years reviewed. At federal level, ten per cent of posts are to be cut, around 49,000, including in defence. That saves about 3.3 billion euros a year, less than a thirtieth of the gap.
Because none of this is enough, the Council lists tax increases with their yield for the federal government. One percentage point more VAT would bring in about 7.5 billion euros; a top income tax rate of 43.3 instead of 42 per cent about 4 billion; a “defence solidarity surcharge” of 2.5 per cent on income, corporation and capital gains tax from 2031 about 10.5 billion; a flat tax on capital income three points higher 0.8 billion. On VAT, the report says it “would generate considerable additional revenue in the short term and impair incentives to work and invest less than an increase in income tax”.
To be fair: the Council also names top earners and capital income, and Schnitzer calls for the burden to be distributed “fairly between the generations and social groups”. But what the Council does not name says just as much. A year ago it deplored the high inequality of wealth and demanded that the preferential treatment of business assets under inheritance tax be “substantially” reduced. In the list for closing a gap of up to 300 billion euros there is nothing about it. The German Trade Union Confederation calls it “incomprehensible” that the Council says “not a word about larger fortunes”.
Everyone who goes shopping pays VAT, but not everyone pays the same in relation to what they have. A pensioner spends her pension, month after month, and pays VAT on almost all of it. Someone who earns a lot puts a large part aside, and on what is invested no VAT is due. What is gentle on “incentives to work and invest” is, for the pensioner, the most expensive tax of all.
In a minority opinion, Veronika Grimm writes that tax increases would aggravate Germany’s problems as a business location; instead, the growth of spending must be limited. With a gap of this size, that means even more cuts in pensions and social benefits. Merz and the CSU leader Söder reject tax increases; Finance Minister Klingbeil does not rule out higher taxes for top earners.
III. What is not asked
One question the Council does not ask: whether defence spending at this level and in this composition makes sense. “Germany must increase its defence capability,” says Schnitzer, and with that the spending is settled. The only remaining question is who pays for it.
What the money buys, we calculated in “Münchhausen’s Heirs”. According to Krebs and Kaczmarczyk, a euro spent on tanks brings at most fifty cents of additional economic output, a euro spent on bridges and railways about two. We compared the defence budget to a bucket with three holes: a large part of the money goes abroad, above all to the USA; another part seeps away in higher prices charged by an industry working at capacity; and what is missing elsewhere as a result is missing from universities, schools and bridges. In “Industrial Subsidy in Camouflage” we showed that much of the money buys the weapons of the last war, and in “The Special (Un)Fund II” that already a third of the first special fund merely made up for cuts in the regular budget.
The report itself supplies the picture. This year the economy is carried above all by government consumption and exports. Next year the strongest push is to come from government investment in equipment, “including military equipment”. Private investment in equipment, by contrast, after 3.3 per cent this year, is to grow by only 0.3 per cent in 2027. The state buys; companies hardly invest any more. That is Münchhausen on the cannonball: the ball carries him through the growth forecast for one year, and the bill for the powder comes later.
IV. The addresses
In “The Reminder Has Arrived” we wrote a little over two weeks ago about the debts for infrastructure: “The reminder has arrived. It is just being sent to the wrong addresses.” Now the addresses are there in black and white. The skilled worker who started at sixteen. The mother whose child-rearing was to be credited in her pension. Everyone who shops in a store or eats at an inn. And as a last resort, from 2031, the top earners too, with a surcharge the chancellor rejects.
Meanwhile the interest on the loans flows to the holders of federal bonds, as we described in “The Other Side of the Coin”. Those who have wealth earn from the debts. Those who have none pay them off. And large fortunes do not appear on the list.
Münchhausen told the story of his ride on the cannonball himself. Who paid for the powder, he never said.
Further reading: Münchhausen’s Heirs · The Reminder Has Arrived · Industrial Subsidy in Camouflage · The Special (Un)Fund II · The Other Side of the Coin · Must States Go Into Debt?