Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 14 November 2026

The Gordian Knot

Why Europe lets Washington dictate where ASML delivers, and where the sword would lie

Washington tells Europe to whom ASML may sell its machines. Yet in Washington itself, export control does not work, as the Nvidia affair has just shown. Europe’s dependence resembles the Gordian knot. It cannot be untied. It can be cut.

I. The Affair in Washington

In November 2026 an affair turned into a government crisis. Jensen Huang, the founder and chief executive of Nvidia, resigned after it became known that he had had a relationship with Alice Huang. She was an executive at Megaspeed, a company in Singapore suspected of smuggling Nvidia chips to China on a large scale. American intelligence agencies consider her an agent of Beijing. The Chinese government denies this.

More interesting than the affair is what the state knew. An intelligence memo about Alice Huang and her relationship with the Nvidia chief was in the hands of the responsible members of the administration as early as the spring. According to American media, her communications had been intercepted since 2025, and President Trump had been informed. Export licences were granted all the same. Megaspeed had almost empty offices, an opaque ownership structure and assets that grew within one year from 33 million to three billion dollars, and Nvidia listed the company as an official cloud partner. According to Axios, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick spent a year preventing Megaspeed from being put on the American sanctions list. Why is not known.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent then declared that President Trump had made it very clear that China should not receive any Nvidia chips more powerful than the A100, an entry-level chip. In December 2025 the same president had allowed the sale to China of the H200, Nvidia’s second most powerful chip, in return for a levy of 25 percent paid to the American treasury.

That is the system whose rules Europe obeys. It leaks, it can be bought, and it changes with the president’s mood. We note that we are not uninvolved here. Anthropic, the company behind Claude, has publicly advocated strict export controls on AI chips and quarrelled publicly with Nvidia about it in 2025. At the end of 2025 Nvidia announced an investment in Anthropic.

II. The Ultimatum

On 2 April 2026, members of both parties introduced the MATCH Act in the US House of Representatives. The bill would ban the sale and, more importantly, the servicing of modern lithography machines in China. Such a machine needs servicing by the manufacturer roughly every six months. Without it, it soon becomes a very expensive paperweight. Whoever controls the servicing also controls the machines that were delivered long ago.

The decisive sentence is in the section on allies. The Netherlands and Japan would have 150 days to adopt the American restrictions. If they do not, Washington is to apply its own law directly to their companies. For ASML, an estimated nine billion dollars of sales in China are at stake.

In “ASML — Europe’s (Last) Trump Card” we described the history as a chronicle of European acquiescence. In 2019, licences for EUV machines to China were not renewed under American pressure; in 2023 the ban on advanced DUV machines followed. This time The Hague is resisting. In May the Dutch government declared that every country is responsible for its own laws. But The Hague is resisting alone.

III. The Knot Inside the Machine

Why can Washington give orders to a European company at all? The answer lies in the machine itself.

An ASML EUV system consists of around 100,000 parts from more than 5,000 suppliers. The most important ones come from Europe. The mirrors and lenses are made by Carl Zeiss in Oberkochen, the only supplier in the world. ASML owns a quarter of the Zeiss unit; there is no second supplier. The high-power laser for the light source comes from Trumpf in Ditzingen. The light source itself, however, is built by Cymer in San Diego. ASML bought the company in 2013 to secure supply. It stayed where it was.

So an American thread runs through the heart of the machine. Through American components and American technology, American export law reaches the whole device. One thread from San Diego is enough for Washington to have a say over a machine from Veldhoven whose laser comes from Swabia and whose optics come from the Ostalb.

But the knot has two ends. Without ASML, America cannot make leading-edge chips either. Not Intel, and not TSMC’s new fabs in Arizona. The think tank Bruegel put it soberly in May 2026: American export controls on lithography tools only function with Dutch cooperation. Each side holds the other. This is not a situation in which one commands and the other obeys. It is a negotiating position. Europe simply does not use it.

IV. The Knot of Gordion

In 333 BC Alexander came to Gordion in Phrygia. In the temple stood an old wagon whose shaft was tied with a knot of bark, so intricately twisted that no one could find its ends. Whoever untied it, it was said, would rule Asia. Alexander did not try for long. He drew his sword and cut it through.

The lesson of the legend is often told wrongly. It is not that the knot cannot be solved. It is that it cannot be untied and must therefore be cut.

Europe’s dependence on the United States is such a knot. Security, energy, payments, data centres, software and intelligence are so intertwined that every thread one pulls tightens another. Whoever sets ASML against Washington risks tariffs, liquefied gas and the nuclear umbrella. So one prefers to pull on none.

Where that leads was shown in the summer of 2025. On 27 July 2025, Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump agreed on a trade deal at his golf course in Turnberry. Europe accepted a tariff of 15 percent on most of its goods, promised energy purchases of 750 billion dollars and investments of 600 billion dollars in the United States. France’s prime minister François Bayrou called it a dark day on which an alliance of free peoples resigned itself to submission. We described this in “The Protection Racket”. Whoever does not cut the knot is bound by it.

V. Who Wields the Sword?

A sword needs a hand. In the European Union, foreign and security policy is decided by the member states, and unanimously. On 23 February 2026, Hungary blocked both the 90-billion-euro loan for Ukraine and the twentieth sanctions package. One country out of twenty-seven is enough for nothing to happen. Europe resembles an orchestra in which every musician has a veto over the score. Even the best conductor fails at that.

That is why leadership in Europe never came from Brussels and never from everyone at once. On 14 June 1985, five states signed an agreement on open borders in the Luxembourg village of Schengen on the Moselle, outside the Community treaties: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The others followed later, once it worked. The euro was pushed through by Kohl and Mitterrand; several countries are still not part of it. In 1994 Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers made this a principle in their paper on a core Europe: whoever wants to, goes ahead.

VI. Four Countries, Four Threads

For ASML, one would not need to win over twenty-seven governments. The countries where the threads come together are enough.

The Netherlands has the machine. Germany has the laser and the optics, two of the three most important parts. Without Berlin, The Hague cannot enforce anything, and without The Hague, Berlin has nothing in hand. The key therefore lies in Berlin, which has never regarded these threads as a lever of its own.

Belgium supplies no component, but the knowledge of how to make chips with the machine. At the imec research centre in Leuven, the world’s major chipmakers jointly develop their next manufacturing generations. In June 2024 ASML and imec opened a joint lab in which chipmakers and suppliers test the newest generation of machines before it stands in their own fabs. ASML builds the instrument, Zeiss and Trumpf supply the key parts, and imec is the conservatory in which the world learns to play it. And at Euroclear, Belgium holds most of the Russian central bank money frozen in Europe, 193 billion euros in September 2025, almost a third of Belgium’s economic output. That is a pledge for any future negotiation with Moscow. How much power lies in it was shown by Prime Minister Bart De Wever in December 2025, when he prevented the money from being used for Ukraine. Whoever holds the pledge has a veto over its use.

France supplies nothing essential for the machine. It brings political weight within the Union and, as the EU’s only nuclear power, the backing one needs when taking on Washington.

These four countries lie side by side. With Italy and Luxembourg they founded the Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and with Luxembourg they signed Schengen in 1985. They would almost be the old core Europe again, and together they would hold enough to act without waiting for all the others.

VII. The Stroke Has a Price

That such a knot can be cut was demonstrated by France. On 7 March 1966, Charles de Gaulle informed President Johnson that France was leaving NATO’s integrated military command. American troops had to leave the country; within a year the bases were cleared. The alliance’s headquarters moved from France to Belgium, where it still stands. France remained in the alliance politically, and the world did not end.

It was possible because de Gaulle had first built something of his own: the force de frappe, France’s own nuclear deterrent. That is the condition for any stroke of the sword. One needs the replacement before one strikes.

Europe cannot cut the whole knot at once. Alexander had no hostages; Europe has many. But individual strands can be severed, and with ASML three are obvious.

The first costs almost nothing. The decision on where ASML delivers becomes a European decision of the four countries, no longer a Dutch one taken under pressure from Washington. A small country can be blackmailed. Four founding states that together own the machine, its most important parts and the research behind it are a negotiating partner.

The second costs time. Development of the light source is brought to Europe, where the laser comes from anyway. That takes years. Only then will the American arm no longer reach into the machine.

The third is the emergency. If the MATCH Act becomes law and the ultimatum runs, the Union has a tool created precisely for such pressure: the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Whether Europe uses it will show whether it still makes policy or merely administers.

The price is real. Washington can respond with tariffs, with liquefied gas, with the intelligence on which Europe depends. Whoever keeps quiet about that is whitewashing. But doing nothing also has a price, and Europe is already paying it. It pays it in Turnberry, in Veldhoven and in every list that is written in Washington and stamped in The Hague.

Alexander did not deliberate for long whether the knot could be untied. Europe has been deliberating for decades and pulls it tighter every year.

Further reading: ASML — Europe’s (Last) Trump Card · What Europe Can Do Now · The Protection Racket · The Rabbit Europe and the Brinkmanship Snakes · What Remained of the Show · From Both Shelves

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 14 November 2026.

Sources. F.A.Z., Winand von Petersdorff, “Die Nvidia-Affäre wird zur Regierungskrise”, 13 November 2026. · implicator.ai, “Nvidia board investigates Jensen Huang over Megaspeed tie”, 8 November 2026; Sovereign Magazine, “Questions Over Jensen Huang and a Suspected Chinese Spy …”, 9 November 2026; Nvidia, Statement from NVIDIA Board of Directors, 8 November 2026. · Reuters, “US to allow Nvidia H200 chip shipments to China, Trump says”, 8/9 December 2025; Semafor, “Trump says Nvidia can sell powerful H200 AI chips to China”, 9 December 2025. · Reuters and TrendForce on the MATCH Act, introduced on 2 April 2026, and on pressure on the Netherlands, 25 August 2026; IO+, “ASML caught between US and China over MATCH Act”, 12 October 2026; Tom’s Hardware and DutchNews.nl on the Dutch government’s position, 2026; Model Diplomat on the Bruegel analysis of May 2026. · The Irish Times, “Cornering the market for machines that make Nvidia’s AI chips”, 1 October 2026; Sovereign Magazine on ASML’s stake in Zeiss SMT, 2026. · ASML and imec, “ASML and imec open joint High NA EUV Lithography Lab”, press release, 3 June 2024. · AFP/The Local, “What we know so far about the EU-US trade deal”, 28 July 2025; Axios, “U.S. reaches trade agreement with Europe with 15% tariff”, 27 July 2025. · Euromaidan Press on Hungary’s veto of 23 February 2026; AP on Euroclear and Belgium, 19 December 2025; Responsible Statecraft on the summit of 18/19 December 2025. · Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985; Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, “Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik”, CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 1 September 1994. · Charles de Gaulle, letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 March 1966.