Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 11 November 2026

It Will All Be Fine – Want to Bet?

… or lying to ourselves

Europe has two great partners and a hope for each. The Chinese are partners after all, and once Trump is gone the partnership with America will work again. Both hopes have one thing in common: they allow Europe to carry on as before. In the autumn of 2026 one can watch how this bet is going.

I. The bet

The German television show “Wetten, dass..?” (“Want to bet?”) had two roles. The contestants bet on what they themselves could do, and had practised for months. The celebrity guests on the sofa practised nothing. They only guessed whether the contestants would succeed, and whoever guessed wrong had to pay a forfeit, usually something embarrassing in front of the cameras.

Europe sits on the sofa. It bets on what others will do: that Beijing will trade fairly if asked nicely, and that Washington will become reliable again once the current president leaves. A bet on other people’s performance demands none of one’s own. Whoever bets this way need not change. That is its real attraction.

II. The partner in the East

In February 2026 Friedrich Merz travelled to China for the first time as chancellor. He spoke of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. The word “rival”, with which Germany’s China strategy has described the People’s Republic since 2023, did not pass his lips in public. Xi Jinping praised the federal government’s pragmatic China policy.

Eight months later, on 6 October, Merz and Emmanuel Macron wrote to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. They called for a new instrument allowing Brussels to intervene quickly in cases of serious market distortion and, as a last resort, to cut off access to the single market. The press calls it the “kill switch”. China is not named in the letter; it is meant all the same. “Whoever seeks a trade conflict with us will learn that we are now defending ourselves,” Merz said. On 16 October the EU summit tasked the Commission with drafting instruments of this kind. A proposal is due before the December summit.

From partnership to kill switch in eight months: that looks like learning. One could have learned earlier, though. According to Sander Tordoir of the Centre for European Reform, more than 50 of the world’s 70 largest economies had erected trade barriers against China the year before. Germany, Tordoir says, had long resisted a tougher line. How long the West reassured itself about China we described in “The Next Illusion About China Will Soon Fall”.

What the negotiations have produced so far is set out in an agreement of 9 October. Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič brought three results back from Beijing: China is to cut its exports of hybrid cars to the EU by more than half, licences for rare earths are to be granted faster through a dedicated channel, and Chinese tariffs will fall on European goods worth almost four billion euros. The EU’s trade deficit with China, in Šefčovič’s own words, exceeds one billion euros. Every day.

Beijing’s ambassador to the EU, Cai Run, said in June that the two sides were “partners, not rivals, and certainly not enemies”. On 5 November he said that if the EU insisted on restrictive and discriminatory measures, China would have to take countermeasures. That is no contradiction. A partner who knows what he wants on both sides of the table can be friendly and threaten within the same six months.

III. The partner in the West

On 3 November Trump’s Republicans lost both chambers of Congress. In Europe the relief was great. Markus Söder, the Bavarian premier, saw the “chance of a new beginning” for transatlantic relations. Katharina Dröge, leader of the Greens in the Bundestag, called the result “a signal of hope far beyond the USA”. The EU’s foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas hoped the new Congress would strengthen transatlantic unity and support for Ukraine.

To be fair: Merz himself expects no fundamental change of course. And Stormy-Annika Mildner of the Aspen Institute Germany said the election was “no all-clear” for Europe.

She is right, for a reason older than Trump. In “Negative Feedback Returns” we recalled that Barack Obama called the Europeans “free riders” back in 2016. A Democratic Congress will expect Europe to pay for its defence, and it will be pleased if Europe buys American while doing so. The 15 per cent tariff the EU accepted in the summer of 2025 did not disappear with the election. The expectation that the old order will return after Trump confuses a style with an interest. The style can go. The interest stays.

IV. At other people’s table

How little say Europe has in this triangle became clear on 9 November. That day China extended the suspension of its tightened export controls on rare earths by two months, to 10 January 2027. Beijing had imposed the controls in October 2025 in its trade dispute with the United States; they were suspended after Xi and Trump met in Busan, South Korea. The extension is part of the same bargain. At the end of November Trump meets Xi at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, reportedly for the third time this year.

Without rare earths, electric motors, wind turbines and arms factories in Europe stand still. Whether they are delivered is negotiated between Washington and Beijing, to the rhythm of their summits. Europe is not a party to these talks. It is bycatch, as we put it in “Will Europe Become Asia’s Appendix?”, working on a revocable licence.

V. The most tempting offer

Anyone who wants to hear the most comfortable solution of all will find it in an interview The Pioneer published on 22 October. Henry Huiyao Wang, founder of the Beijing think tank Center for China and Globalization and formerly an adviser to China’s State Council, makes Europe an offer.

Germany should use cheap green technology from China, electric cars, solar modules and wind turbines; that would make its industry more competitive. The Chinese partners of Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes should invest in Germany together with them, just as Volkswagen once did in China. Japan, he says, did something similar in the eighties, and the worries of the time vanished. Berlin and Paris should leave bloc logic behind and take a neutral position between the USA and China. China, he says, is “the gym of world industry”: whoever wants to hold their own on the world market must first hold their own in China.

The offer is tempting because it asks nothing of Europe. One buys cheaply, has factories built and stays out of the quarrels of the great. Wang leaves out two things. Volkswagen did not enter a joint venture voluntarily. China demanded one of every foreign carmaker, with at most half of the shares, and lifted the requirement for passenger cars only in 2022, when its own industry had mastered the technology. And Japanese carmakers built their plants in America because Washington capped their exports in 1981 through a “voluntary” restraint. The plants were the answer to a trade barrier, not proof that none is needed.

What the offer looks like in practice we described in “Five Months Later”. At the end of October the F.A.Z. reported that Volkswagen’s board was considering building complete cars from its Chinese joint ventures in Zwickau. Development and parts would come from China, only final assembly from Germany. That would be the partnership Wang has in mind: Europe as the extended workbench of a country that was once its extended workbench.

One sentence in the interview does touch a sore point, though. His European friends, Wang says, are spoilt by their welfare system: in August you send them a message and get no answer for two weeks. No one need begrudge them their holiday. The problem is that during that time nobody answers. We know this slowness from our own experience, and not only in August: processes that used to take days now take weeks, and if nobody pushes, they peter out altogether. On this point Wang is right, and no kill switch will change it. Whoever wants to hold their own in competition need not work around the clock. But someone must answer, and things must move forward.

VI. The orders of magnitude

While all this is happening, the federal government is negotiating the 2027 budget. On 12 November the budget committee begins its final session. The quarrels are over a plastics tax and a sugar tax, each meant to raise a few hundred million euros, and over cuts to housing benefit and the abolition of an immediate child supplement, together some 770 million euros.

For comparison: in the first half of 2026 Germany imported goods worth 52.7 billion euros more from China than it exported there. That is around 290 million euros a day. The comparison limps, and we say where: a trade deficit is not a loss in the budget, and for a family receiving housing benefit 770 million euros are no trifle. But it shows how attention is distributed. Sums that the deficit with China reaches in three days are fought over in public for weeks. For the questions on which industry depends, electricity prices, raw materials, and production engineering, which no longer features in Germany’s top research funding, as we showed in “Excellent Production Engineering”, there is nothing on the table except the kill switch.

And the kill switch is a defensive instrument. It can keep things from getting worse. It does not make them better. A homeowner who installs a burglar alarm has not yet repaired a leaking roof.

Even the two new taxes contain a contradiction. They are meant to reduce the consumption of sugar and plastic and at the same time plug holes in the budget. The tax on sugary soft drinks is to bring the health insurers around 690 million euros from July 2027; the plastics tax, which the Christian Democrats now reject, well over a billion a year from 2028. The better the steering works, the less they raise. Britain has shown this. When it announced its levy on sugary drinks in 2016, the government expected 520 million pounds a year. By the time it came into force in 2018, manufacturers had taken so much sugar out of their recipes that the estimate fell to 240 million. Chancellor Philip Hammond, unusually, was glad to announce it. The school programmes the money was meant to pay for still had to be funded from other sources. In Berlin, Finance Minister Klingbeil is already accused of setting the sugar thresholds too low in order to raise more revenue. A tax that achieves its aim the better the less it raises cannot be booked as fixed income without one of its two purposes falling by the wayside.

VII. Cooperation without lies

None of this speaks against cooperation. The great tasks of our time can only be solved worldwide: the climate, the rules for artificial intelligence, the debts of many poor countries, epidemics. Wang names the same issues, and there he is right. Europe and China both stand by the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement; the present American administration does not.

But cooperation is a business between partners, and a partner is only someone who brings something the other needs and does not have. Europe still has such things: ASML’s lithography machines, without which no leading-edge chip is made, machine tools, pharmaceuticals, a single market of 450 million people. Each of these strengths shrinks if no one invests in it. Whoever brings nothing any more is not a partner in cooperation but a sales market.

Our conclusion: Europe’s two hopes are not misjudgements that better information could correct. The information is available, the figures are public, the threats are spoken aloud. They are hopes held on to because their opposite would mean work: higher spending on one’s own security, one’s own supply chains for raw materials, an industrial policy that is more than defence, and cuts that cannot be quarrelled over for weeks without losing voters. That is lying to ourselves: not ignorance of the situation, but the refusal to draw consequences from it.

On the sofa of “Wetten, dass..?” whoever guessed wrong paid. Europe’s bet is different. If the bet on others is lost, it is not paid by those who placed it, but by the generation that inherits the bill after them.

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 11 November 2026.

Sources. Federal Government, press statements by the Chancellor before departing for China and in Beijing, 24 and 25 February 2026; t-online/dpa, “Tauwetter, aber kein deutsch-chinesischer Frühling”, 25 February 2026. · Berliner Zeitung, “‘Die EU ist ihr eigener schlimmster Feind’: China kontert Europas Handelsdrohung”, 17 October 2026; South China Morning Post, report on the letter from Macron and Merz to von der Leyen, 6 October 2026. · Centre for European Reform, interview with Sander Tordoir, “Mit dieser Strategie kann Merz in die Geschichtsbücher eingehen”, 9 October 2026. · European Council, conclusions of 16 October 2026; Euronews, “EU trade chief seeks to rebalance EU-China trade as Brussels weighs tougher measures”, 23 October 2026; China Observers in Europe, “The EU’s Chinese October: From Partner to ‘Kill-Switch’”, October 2026. · Eunews, “EU and China reach agreement on hybrid cars, Šefčovič: ‘Exports from Beijing will be halved’”, 9 October 2026; Euronews, “EU and China clinch deal over cars after heated trade talks”, 9 October 2026. · The Sun Malaysia/AFP, “China warns EU against trade actions, urges dialogue”, 25 June 2026; South China Morning Post, “EU-China truce under strain as both sides brace for potential trade war”, 6 November 2026; Euronews, “China threatens EU with retaliation as EU mulls kill switch”, 5 November 2026. · Hasepost, “Midterms 2026: Deutsche Politik reagiert auf US-Wahlausgang”, 4 November 2026; web.de/AFP, “Für Europa keine Entwarnung”, 5 November 2026; Courthouse News, “Relief in Europe, but no reset expected after US midterms”, 4 November 2026. · Reuters, “China extends suspension of new rare earth controls until January”, 9 November 2026; The National, “China extends pause on rare earth export curbs for two months”, 9 November 2026. · René Ruschmeier, “China ist das Fitnessstudio der Weltindustrie”, interview with Henry Huiyao Wang, The Pioneer, 22 October 2026. · Bild, quoted by Yahoo Nachrichten, “Merz-Regierung im Clinch um Haushalt 2027”, 9 November 2026; news.de, “Haushalt 2027: Steuer-Pläne sorgen für Wirbel”, 8 November 2026. · Stuttgarter Zeitung, “Plastik, Zucker, Tabak – so soll der Bund Milliarden einnehmen”, 10 November 2026; ZDFheute, “Frei: ‘Die Plastiksteuer machen wir nicht’”, 9 November 2026; Tagesspiegel, “Über diese Steuer-Vorhaben streitet die Koalition auf den letzten Metern”, 10 November 2026. · Food Navigator, “Reformulation success: UK says planned sugar tax revenues to fall”, March 2017; IFT, “UK soda tax goes into effect”, 9 April 2018; Action on Sugar, “Soft Drinks Industry Levy”. · Federal Statistical Office, press releases of 20 February 2026 (foreign trade 2025) and August 2026 (first half of 2026). · Our texts: “Negative Feedback Returns”, “Will Europe Become Asia’s Appendix?”, “Five Months Later”, “Excellent Production Engineering”, “The Next Illusion About China Will Soon Fall”.