Essay · Hans Ley & Claude Dedo · 17 November 2026

The Right Stable Scent

How Germany's ruling class has reproduced itself since Bismarck – and why the few who rise from below are its best alibi

In Germany, the top people in business, the judiciary, the civil service and politics still come from almost the same milieus as under Wilhelm II. Three changes of regime have done little to alter that. Anyone who wants to understand why failure at the top so rarely has consequences has to start with Bismarck.

I. The wrong comparison and the right one

In “The New Nomenklatura and the Party Cartel” we showed how the parties hand out posts and access, and where the comparison with East Germany limps. Here we ask the question that comes before it: who gets anywhere near those posts at all, in politics, but also in corporations, banks, courts and ministries? And why, since Bismarck, has it almost always been the same people?

We do not claim equivalence with the GDR here either. The ruling SED needed a Politburo that directly filled 1,085 leading positions on its own, a single party, a controlled press and an apparatus of repression. None of that exists in the Federal Republic. We claim something else, and it can be documented: after 1945 both German states grew from the same root, the Prussian-German authoritarian state with its civil-service aristocracy, its privilege for lawyers and its habit of taking origin for aptitude. The GDR turned this into a nomenklatura with a party card. The Federal Republic turned it into a system that needs no centre and still produces the same result: a small stratum recruits from itself, protects itself and survives its own failures.

The hardest evidence comes from the sociologist Michael Hartmann. He traced the origins of almost 2,400 top people in business, the judiciary, the civil service and politics across more than a century. In 1907, 14.1 percent of top managers came from the working class or the lower middle class. In 2020 the figure was 19.1 percent. The Empire, the Weimar Republic, National Socialism and the Federal Republic changed almost nothing about the social origins of the elite in 113 years. Hartmann called his study “More Continuity than Change”.

II. Bismarck’s state

The Empire that Bismarck created in 1871 was at its core a Prussian authoritarian state. In Prussia, the largest member state, the three-class franchise, which gave the votes of the wealthy many times the weight of others, remained in force until 1918. The Reichstag could pass laws but could not elect a chancellor. Government came from above, administered by a civil service that chose its own members.

Historians described early on how it did so. Before the First World War the state managed to secure a “reasonably homogeneous higher civil service” by favouring some candidates and excluding others. For socialists, entry into the higher administration was impossible. For Catholics, Jews, democrats and even liberals it was made difficult. Anyone who wanted to join needed two state law examinations. As early as 1909 the Kölnische Zeitung and other papers were writing about a “lawyers’ monopoly”. On top of that came admission tickets written into no law: a commission as a reserve officer and membership of the right student fraternity.

This produced a pattern that still holds today. The qualification the state demanded was formal and open to anyone. The conditions under which it actually counted were informal and open to few. A factory worker’s son could in theory become a junior judge. In practice he lacked the money for the long years of study, the fraternity, the officer’s commission and the father who knew the district governor.

In business the same applied in another form. The big banks and heavy industry grew closely together with the state. Hartmann’s baseline of 14.1 percent of managers from below dates from this period.

III. The republic without republicans

In 1918 the monarchy fell. Its servants stayed. The Weimar Republic took over the judges, civil servants and officers of the Empire almost in their entirety. A democracy was administered by a ruling class that, for the most part, rejected it.

This showed most clearly in the courts. The statistician Emil Julius Gumbel documented the political murders of the first post-war years. For 1919 to 1922 he counted 354 murders from the right and 22 from the left. The murders from the left were punished with ten death sentences. The great majority of murders from the right went unpunished. The Reich Minister of Justice expressly confirmed Gumbel’s figures. His statistics were later criticised on methodological grounds, but this did not change their core. In 1932, at his university’s instigation, Gumbel himself lost his licence to teach in Heidelberg.

Meanwhile the Reich Court used the new constitution to give itself powers it had not had under the Empire. It interpreted property as an almost untouchable fundamental right, against a constitution that expressly gave the legislature broad powers over property.

The lesson of Weimar is simple: you can replace a form of state without replacing the people who run it. Then they run the new form of state by the standards of the old one.

IV. The elite under Hitler

National Socialism needed the old elite, and the elite made itself available. Industrialists and bankers met in the “Circle of Friends of the Reichsführer SS”, which supplied the SS with money outside its budget. By 1945 Friedrich Flick had, by estimates, given the Nazi party more than 7.6 million Reichsmarks, and he expanded his group partly through “Aryanisations”. Forced labourers had to work in his plants.

Hermann Josef Abs, later the most influential banker of the Federal Republic, joined the management board of Deutsche Bank in 1938, where he was responsible for the “Aryanisation” of Jewish banks and companies, and in 1940 the supervisory board of I.G. Farben. He was not a party member. He was something more effective: an expert whom any system could use. What is documented about him, what is disputed and what remains sealed, we have compiled in “The Absolute Power of a Technocrat”.

V. 1945: two states, two answers

After 1945 both German states faced the same question: what do you do with a ruling class that has served a criminal regime? They gave opposite answers.

The Federal Republic brought the old elite back. On 11 May 1951 the law implementing Article 131 of the Basic Law came into force. It gave civil servants who had lost their posts in 1945 a right to be re-employed. The results have since been well researched:

  • In the Federal Ministry of Justice, 53 percent of the 170 senior officials studied had been members of the Nazi party. In 1957 the share reached 77 percent, higher than in the Reich Ministry of Justice under Hitler. One in five had been in the SA. The former expert on “racial law” was subsequently in charge of family law.
  • In the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 1953, 22 of the 28 lawyers in the higher service were former Nazi party members.
  • In the Foreign Office in 1950, 58 of 137 members of the higher service had belonged to the Nazi party.
  • The second Bundestag of 1953 included 129 former Nazi party members among its 487 deputies.

Business did not even need a law. Flick was sentenced to seven years in prison at Nuremberg in 1947, was released early and again became one of the richest men in the republic. Abs became spokesman of the management board of Deutsche Bank in 1957 and remained chairman of its supervisory board until 1976. He collected so many supervisory board seats that the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 limited their number to ten per person. The rule was called the “Lex Abs”.

The West German decision can be defended. The young republic needed administrators, and former Nazis were bound into democracy instead of being driven underground. The price was high. The lawyers of the Rosenburg, the seat of the Ministry of Justice, shaped the criminal law of the Federal Republic and saw to it that many Nazi crimes became time-barred. Above all, the West German elite learned a lesson it never forgot: belonging to the right stratum survives every change of regime, even moral bankruptcy.

The GDR replaced the elite. Judges were replaced by “people’s judges” trained in crash courses, and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Faculties opened the universities to children who would never before have seen the inside of a grammar school. It was the largest elite of social climbers in German history. It was steered through the nomenklatura system. Anyone who wanted to rise no longer needed the right father, but the right convictions.

The sociologist Heike Solga examined what became of this elite from below. After the first generation the channels of advancement closed again, this time in favour of the SED’s “socialist service class”. The children of the new elite were given preference in entering the elite in their turn. The career blockages hit above all the children of workers and collective farmers. The GDR, Karl Ulrich Mayer and Solga sum up, had a “very small, politically and socio-economically privileged ruling elite that was intent on passing these privileges on to its children”. It was exactly the “new class” that Milovan Đilas had described in 1957.

This is the most important finding of the whole comparison. An elite that comes from below does not stay open. After one generation it closes just like the old one.

VI. Germany Inc.

The Federal Republic of the post-war decades liked to call its economic model “Rhenish capitalism”. Its backbone was the so-called Deutschland AG, “Germany Inc.”, a web of shareholdings and supervisory board seats with the big banks at its centre, and for a long time Abs at the centre of the big banks.

In Germany Inc. the same men who had appointed one another then supervised one another. The CEO of one group sat on the supervisory board of another and vice versa. It was comfortable, predictable and successful as long as the economy grew. But it was also a closed circle one could enter only by invitation.

Germany Inc. has largely been dissolved since the 1990s. Its way of thinking has not. According to the board report of the executive search firm Odgers, in 2025 77 percent of DAX board members came from their own industry, and their average age reached a record 54.6 years. Odgers itself headlines the finding “Continuity instead of a fresh wind”.

VII. 1990: the second transfer of elites

In 1990 the story of 1945 repeated itself in reverse. This time it was the GDR elite that was replaced, and this time there was no replacement from its own ranks. Civil servants, judges and managers from the West went East with a bonus popularly known as “bush allowance” and took over the leadership there.

They stayed. According to studies by the University of Leipzig, East Germans held only 23 percent of elite positions in eastern Germany itself in 2016, and 1.7 percent nationwide. In 2022 the eastern figure was 26 percent, although more than 80 percent of the population there is East German. According to the Elite Monitor of the universities of Leipzig and Jena, East Germans held 12.1 percent of top positions nationwide in 2024, against a population share of 19.4 percent. On the boards of large companies and among the generals of the Bundeswehr they are practically absent. The 2023 elite survey names unequal networks as a main reason.

Here the parallel with cadre logic is strongest, only without a party. Nobody decided to keep East Germans out. It is enough that the people at the top promote those they know, and that they do not know any East Germans.

VIII. The stable and its scent

How closure works without a decision is what Hartmann showed in his book “The Myth of the Performance Elites”. He compared the careers of 6,500 holders of doctorates in engineering, law and economics, that is, people with the same formal qualification. With the same doctorate, children of the upper bourgeoisie, the top 0.5 percent of the population, had twice the chance of reaching a top position in a large company as the others. Around 80 percent of the CEOs of the hundred largest companies came from the upper or upper-middle bourgeoisie.

Performance was not what tipped the balance. Hartmann draws on the concept of habitus coined by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Those who decide on top positions look for familiarity with the unwritten rules, for entrepreneurial optimism and above all for personal poise and self-assurance. One knows what is done and what is not, one knows the codes, the manners, the clothes. Those born at the top absorbed this with their mother’s milk. Those who come from below have to learn it, and they are recognised by the small things.

It can be put more simply. The stable you come from can be denied, but not changed. The scent of the stable above, by contrast, you take on by yourself over time, and if you want to, you can acquire it faster and of your own accord. In German the word for it is “Stallgeruch”, the smell of the stable, and it means exactly this: the unmistakable sign that you belong. That is what most social climbers do.

From this follows something that is almost always overlooked in the debate about equal opportunity. Origin at the top shapes the elite as a whole more strongly than origin at the bottom. Those who rise from humble circumstances often carry their origin before them like a monstrance. Now and then a coarse word slips out to show they are down to earth. But in everything that matters they try to belong: how one behaves, what one says and what one does not say. They have made it and on no account want to fall back, and their children are to continue the ascent. It is not the climber who changes the elite. It is the elite that changes the climber.

The GDR is the proof on a large scale. An entire elite of workers’ and peasants’ children became, within one generation, a class that handed its privileges on to its own children.

IX. Two nobodies

The prime example in the Federal Republic is Gerhard Schröder. His father was killed in the war, his mother worked as a cleaner, and he took his school-leaving exam through evening classes. As a young member of the Bundestag he shook the fence of the Chancellery one evening and shouted: “I want to get in there!” In 1998 he was in.

As chancellor he appeared in Brioni suits and with Cohiba cigars and openly displayed how much he enjoyed his rise. He did not acquire the bosses’ stable scent over the years; he bought it. People called him the “comrade of the bosses”. Less than three weeks after he had vacated the Chancellery, it became known that he would chair the shareholders’ committee of Nord Stream AG, whose majority owner is Gazprom. As chancellor he had agreed the pipeline with Vladimir Putin himself. Later came the chairmanship of the supervisory board of the Russian state oil company Rosneft. In 2004 he called Putin a “flawless democrat”, and in 2012 he had nothing to take back (Flawless Democrats).

Putin grew up in a communal flat in Leningrad, the son of a worker. He, too, is a nobody who made it all the way to the top. The two evidently found the perfect partner in each other. In April 2014, a few weeks after the annexation of Crimea, Schröder held a belated celebration of his 70th birthday in St Petersburg at the invitation of Nord Stream and embraced Putin in front of the cameras. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 he gave up the Rosneft chairmanship and declined a seat on the Gazprom supervisory board. He did not distance himself from Putin. In May 2026 Putin proposed him as a mediator between Russia and Europe. In October 2026 he received him at his home for his 74th birthday. The Kremlin announced that the president had invited “his old friend”.

What goes on inside the two of them we do not know. What they do in public is documented. Our conclusion from it: here two climbers are celebrating that they have made it, and each confirms to the other that he belongs.

X. The alibi

The word “meritocracy”, the rule of the deserving, comes from the British sociologist Michael Young. He coined it in 1958 in a satirical book meant as a warning. In his story, selection by intelligence replaces selection by birth, and a new, rigid caste emerges that no longer has to justify its place at the top, because after all it has earned it. The story ends in 2033 with an uprising of the excluded against the elite. In 2001, a year before his death, Young complained in the Guardian that Tony Blair of all people had adopted the word without any irony. He had expected that the poor and disadvantaged would be put down, “and in fact that is what has happened”.

Here lies the real function of the climbers. They are few, in business according to Hartmann just under a fifth. But they are indispensable. Every Schröder proves that anyone can make it. And if anyone can make it, then everyone at the top has made it, including the many who were simply born in the right stable. The climber legitimises the heirs. Without him they would have to explain why they sit where they sit. With him they do not.

As a rule the climbers do not do this on purpose. They do it by adopting the rules they find at the top, and by telling their own story as proof that the system is open.

XI. The balance sheet of the present

What the continuity from Bismarck to today means is shown by the state of the ruling classes in 2026.

Politics is a closed profession. In the 21st Bundestag, 81 percent of deputies have a university degree, compared with about one in five in the population. 162 of the 630 deputies studied law or political science. The Empire’s lawyers’ monopoly lives on in parliament. The share of the self-employed and freelancers has fallen from 28 to 21 percent. The public service is the springboard.

The door revolves in both directions. How softly former office-holders land, we described in “The New Nomenklatura”. The two most recent finance ministers are taking the path right now: Christian Lindner to the consultancy Teneo, Jörg Kukies to the investment bank Morgan Stanley, both only after a cooling-off period. In the other direction, today’s economics minister Katherina Reiche headed Westenergie, a subsidiary of the energy group E.ON, until 2025.

Failure at the top has no consequences. - The car toll cost the federal government 243 million euros in damages to the operators, because the transport minister had signed the contracts before the European Court of Justice ruled. His successor waived any recourse against him. - On the purchase of protective masks in the pandemic, the special investigator appointed by the ministry itself spoke of a “drama worth billions”. The Christian Democrats rejected a parliamentary inquiry. The responsible former minister, Jens Spahn, stepped down as parliamentary group leader in July 2026, for a reason that had nothing to do with the masks. - In the cum-ex affair, the Cologne public prosecutor’s office is investigating around 1,750 suspects. By May 2026 it had brought 16 indictments against 26 people. In cum-cum cases there was not a single indictment in 2025. In October 2026 the Bonn Regional Court discontinued the case against a former risk controller of Warburg Bank, with damages of 278.6 million euros at issue, in return for a payment of 40,000 euros. The convicted cum-ex initiator Hanno Berger owes the state around 13.6 million euros. So far 45,680 euros have been collected.

The controllers fail and get off very cheaply. At Wirecard, the financial supervisor and the auditor EY failed. The auditor oversight body fined EY 500,000 euros, for certifying a fraud worth billions.

The state outsources thinking and planning. The federal government’s spending on outside consultants rose by 39 percent from 2020 to 2023, to over 240 million euros. The Federal Court of Audit finds that in doing so it is handing over “even core functions of the administration”.

Closure begins at school. According to the IQB education report 2024, ninth-graders from homes with more than 100 books are around 80 points ahead of the others in mathematics, about a year and a half of schooling. This gap has not narrowed in over a decade. A third of ninth-graders fail the minimum standard for the intermediate school certificate.

The big ones look after themselves. What that means in detail we showed in two addenda. Deutsche Bank renamed and overruled its own alarms instead of heeding them (We Are a Different Bank Now). A publishing chief was given a billion and on the relevant date was too poor for the tax (Poor for Six Days). A carmaker whose profit had halved went on paying out billions in dividends and share buybacks in 2026. In the same year it postponed a special payment for around 90,000 employees and, according to Handelsblatt, proposed raising their working week from 35 to 38 hours without additional pay. The standard by which all this is right we described in “The General Measure”: whatever preserves the institution is right.

The court has its chroniclers. Alongside the press that uncovers, a press has arisen that builds a stage for the powerful. In July 2026 the publicist Gabor Steingart held the first “Pioneer Finance Week” in Frankfurt, with the Hessian prime minister and the CEO of Deutsche Bank on board his media ship. Steingart says: “For us a company is not a hostile entity and a CEO is not a prince of darkness.” His co-host Alev Doğan says “that practically all CEOs talk to us, and especially to Gabor, regularly”. The second-largest shareholder in his company is the Springer group. Its CEO Mathias Döpfner launched the business initiative “Made for Germany” in 2025 together with Christian Sewing of Deutsche Bank and Roland Busch of Siemens. How this web works we showed in “The Titanisation of the Confetti Cannon”, “Flawless Democrats” and “The Pop-Gun”, and how well lamenting decline pays, in “Das Kommentariat” (German).

XII. What does not fit

A merciless analysis must also be merciless towards itself. Much speaks against the thesis of a closed caste.

Almost everything we have listed here is known because a free press uncovered it. The Deutsche Bank leak was analysed by more than fifty media organisations. Courts have drawn consequences. The former Wirecard CEO has been in pre-trial detention since the summer of 2020, four former VW executives were convicted of fraud, the cum-ex initiator Hanno Berger received eight years in prison, and the leadership of the financial supervisor was removed. In 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court curtailed the parties’ influence over the public broadcaster ZDF. Governments were voted out in 1998, 2005, 2021 and 2025. A third of DAX board members come from abroad; the closure is social, not national. And in top-level politics East Germans are even slightly over-represented.

None of this would have existed in the GDR. The Federal Republic can correct itself. It just does so too late, too rarely and almost never at the top.

Feature GDR nomenklatura Federal Republic today
Recruitment from few milieus Yes, by party loyalty Yes, by origin, habitus and network
Central list of posts Yes, secret No
Self-reproduction through the children Yes, after one generation Yes, for over a hundred years
Exclusion of outsiders Of non-comrades Of the lower classes and East Germans
Failure without consequences Largely Largely at the top, not below
Free press, independent courts, voting out No Yes

XIII. The nomenklatura without a party

The GDR needed a Politburo to determine its ruling class. The Federal Republic needs none. The right father, the right degree, the right habitus and the right acquaintances suffice. What the SED regulated by decree is regulated here by habit, and the habit is older than both German states. It comes from Bismarck’s Prussia, survived Weimar, served Hitler, got its posts back in 1945 and took over the East in 1990.

Against a party you can make a revolution, as in Leipzig in 1989. Against a habit you cannot. You can only make it visible, figure by figure and case by case, until no one can claim any longer that only those who deserve it sit at the top.

Those at the top have made it. Most of them only had to be born in the right stable. The others acquired the right stable scent.

Further reading: The New Nomenklatura and the Party Cartel · The General Measure · We Are a Different Bank Now · Poor for Six Days · The Absolute Power of a Technocrat · The Cart in the Mud · Bande von Betrügern (German)

Hans Ley & Claude Dedo (Anthropic) — Nuremberg, 17 November 2026.

Sources. Michael Hartmann, “Mehr Kontinuität als Wandel”, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 2025; idem, Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten. Spitzenkarrieren und soziale Herkunft in Wirtschaft, Politik, Justiz und Wissenschaft, Frankfurt/New York 2002; interview “Den Normalsterblichen überlegen”, der Freitag. · Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, 1979 (German: Die feinen Unterschiede, Frankfurt 1982). · Rudolf Pikart / Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1958, no. 2 (civil service policy in Prussia); debate on the “Juristenmonopol”, Kölnische Zeitung 15.1.1909 and others. · Emil Julius Gumbel, Vier Jahre politischer Mord, Berlin 1922; Klaus Füßer, “Republikfeindliche Tendenzrechtsprechung in Weimar? Zur Aussagekraft der Gumbel-Mordstatistik”, 1991; Heidelberg University on the Gumbel case. · Clara Maier, “Legal Counterrevolution: Property and Judicial Power in the Weimar Republic”, Modern Intellectual History 2024. · Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Case 5 (Flick), judgment of 22.12.1947; on Abs, the sources in our essay “The Absolute Power of a Technocrat”. · Law regulating the legal status of persons covered by Article 131 of the Basic Law, 11 May 1951. · Manfred Görtemaker, Christoph Safferling, Die Akte Rosenburg, Munich 2016; Federal Prosecutor General / Safferling on the Nazi past of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office (LTO); Eckart Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, Munich 2010. · Heike Solga, Auf dem Weg in eine klassenlose Gesellschaft?, Berlin 1995; eadem, “Klassenlagen und soziale Ungleichheit in der DDR”, APuZ 46/1996; Karl Ulrich Mayer, Heike Solga et al., APuZ 46/1996; Milovan Đilas, The New Class, 1957; Otto Wenzel, Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat 26/2009 (Politburo nomenclature). · Odgers, DAX board report 2025. · Michael Bluhm, Olaf Jacobs, Wer beherrscht den Osten?, University of Leipzig/MDR 2016; Hoferichter & Jacobs / University of Leipzig, Der lange Weg nach oben, 2022; Elitenmonitor (universities of Leipzig and Jena, Zittau/Görlitz University), 2024/2025. · Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, London 1958; idem, “Down with meritocracy”, The Guardian, 29.6.2001. · On Lindner and Kukies: abgeordnetenwatch, overview of revolving-door cases 2026; Bundesanzeiger, notice of 23.4.2026 (cooling-off period Kukies). On Berger: Realtid, 13.11.2026; on the Warburg case: Handelsblatt, October 2026; on Mercedes: Handelsblatt (September 2026, 38-hour proposal), auto motor und sport (July 2026, special payment), Mercedes-Benz Group (share buyback programmes 2025/2026). · On Steingart and Pioneer: thepioneer.de, “Pioneer Three: Frankfurt, wir kommen” (July 2026); kom.de, “Auf gesellschaftlicher Mission” (interview, October 2026); kress, 5.11.2026; Deutsche Bank, media release of 21.7.2025 (“Made for Germany”). · On Gerhard Schröder: t-online (2022), The American Interest (2017), jungle.world (2017), Reporter-Forum (2011), Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten (29.4.2014), dpa interview (March 2024), ORF and cash.ch (October 2026), Ukrainska Pravda (May 2026). · Bundestag statistics on deputies’ professions; University of Europe for Applied Sciences on the share of graduates in the 21st Bundestag; LobbyControl and abgeordnetenwatch on cooling-off periods. · LTO on the car toll (waiver of recourse); Handelsblatt on the Sudhof report; ZDF frontal (May 2026) and Handelsblatt (October 2026) on cum-ex; APAS notice of 31.3.2023 on EY; Federal Court of Audit on consultancy spending; IQB-Bildungstrend 2024. · Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 25.3.2014, 1 BvF 1/11 (ZDF Interstate Treaty).