Transparency Council: Profiles of the German Federal Government
Katherina Reiche — what is on record
The profiles of Europe’s leading politicians showed what can be known about the people at the top if one gathers only what is documented. This series does the same for the German federal government. It begins with the ministry where business and the state touch most closely.
Preliminary note
The concept of the Transparency Council starts from the premise that citizens have a right to complete and unbiased information about the people who exercise power over their lives. A profile is therefore not a verdict. It contains what is on public record and names what remains open.
Each profile follows the same structure as the profiles of Europe’s leading politicians: function and mandate, basic political position, key decisions, documented contradictions, conflicts of interest, lobby contacts and transparency, open questions.
The sources are mainly the federal government’s answers to questions from the Bundestag, press releases of the ministry, documents the ministry had to release under the Freedom of Information Act, and investigations the ministry has not contradicted. Most of the questions come from the opposition. The answers, however, are statements of the government itself. Assessments by opponents and interest groups are included only where they are marked as such.
Profile 01 · Katherina Reiche
Function and mandate
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy since 6 May 2025, CDU, born 1973, chemist by training. She is not a member of the Bundestag.
From 1998 to 2015 she was a member of parliament, from 2005 to 2009 deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, then Parliamentary State Secretary in the Environment Ministry and from 2013 in the Transport Ministry. In September 2015 she moved to the Association of Local Utilities (VKU), the lobby of the municipal utilities, as its chief executive. From 2020 until her appointment she was CEO of Westenergie AG, the largest subsidiary of the energy group E.ON and an operator of electricity and gas distribution networks. She also sat on the supervisory board of Schaeffler.
Basic political position
Economically liberal, “technology-open”, with priority for security of supply and costs. On taking office she announced a “reality check” of the energy transition and planned up to 20 gigawatts of new gas-fired power plants. In social policy she calls for longer working lives: “We must work more and longer” (FAZ, July 2025). In industrial policy she relies on artificial intelligence and speaks of a “huge data treasure” of German industry (Hannover Messe, April 2026). We examined this formula in “The Treasure or the Final Sweep-Out”.
Key decisions
Monitoring report, September 2025. On 15 September 2025 the ministry presented a report by the institutes EWI and BET on the state of the energy transition, together with ten “key measures” by the minister, among them “honest assessment of demand” and support for renewables that is “market- and system-friendly”. The Green Budget Germany institute (FÖS) and others have argued that some of the measures contradict the report. The ministry does not see it that way.
Power plant strategy, January 2026. On 15 January 2026 the ministry agreed key points with the European Commission. In 2026, twelve gigawatts of new dispatchable capacity are to be tendered. For ten of them a long-duration criterion applies: the plants must be able to deliver for at least ten hours at a stretch. According to RWE, this applies “above all to gas-fired power plants”. The agreement falls well short of the up to 20 gigawatts in the coalition agreement.
Renewable energy reform and grid package, July 2026. On 29 July 2026 the cabinet adopted a reform of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and a grid connection package. Reiche: “We are ending the EEG as an all-inclusive package.” In grid areas with bottlenecks, new wind and solar plants are no longer to have an unconditional right to grid connection, and their right to compensation for curtailment is to be restricted. The originally planned complete waiver (the “redispatch reservation”) was weakened because of doubts about its compatibility with EU law. The Bundestag and Bundesrat are debating it in autumn 2026.
Documented contradictions
The ministry describes the key points of the power plant strategy as a “technology-neutral expansion of dispatchable capacity”. Yet for ten of the twelve gigawatts in the first tender a criterion applies that, according to one of the largest bidders, is met above all by gas-fired plants.
About her trip to New York in October 2025, the ministry first stated there had been “no further official appointments”. That was untrue, as the ministry later had to admit: the minister had met representatives of start-ups and the manager of a financial investor (see below).
In reply to a question from the Greens about contacts with the gas industry, the ministry stated that the contacts could no longer be established because of “staff changes”. A spokeswoman later called this wording misleading.
As CEO of Westenergie, Reiche described her task on LinkedIn as laying the groundwork for “the success of the Paris climate targets”. At CERAWeek, the conference of the oil and gas industry in Houston, in March 2026, she questioned Germany’s climate target and the EU methane regulation, according to Deutsche Umwelthilfe. Deutsche Umwelthilfe is a party to a legal dispute with the ministry.
Conflicts of interest
Westenergie. Until shortly before her appointment, Reiche ran E.ON’s largest subsidiary. Westenergie operates distribution networks, and the grid package regulates how distribution network operators must connect new plants. On her appointment, LobbyControl stated that she would “not be able to stay out of questions affecting the business interests of Westenergie, E.ON or Ingrid Capacity”. According to the Green MP Michael Kellner, nine meetings took place between E.ON representatives, including group CEO Leonhard Birnbaum, and the ministry between her taking office and February 2026.
Ingrid Capacity. A few days before her nomination she took a seat on the board of directors of the Swedish battery storage company. On 28 April 2025 the company announced that she would give it up because of her appointment. According to the federal government, she has since sold options in the company worth about 3,000 euros.
Assets. According to the federal government’s answer of 4 August 2025 (Bundestag document 21/1136), she holds shares in a company that owns three plots of land and serves “exclusively to manage family assets”. She holds no stock options or comparable remuneration from earlier management roles. She disclosed her assets voluntarily; there is no obligation to do so. She ended all previous professional activities and mandates before taking office.
Rules. According to the government, there are “no special compliance rules” for the minister in the ministry. The general rules for members of the federal government apply. The Federal Ministers Act contains no criteria for assessing conflicts of interest. Recusal from particular decisions “was and is not called for and has not taken place”.
The 2015 move. Reiche announced her move to the VKU while the law on cooling-off periods for departing members of government was being debated. It did not yet apply to her. Since July 2015, ministers and parliamentary state secretaries can be barred from such a move for up to 18 months.
Lobby contacts and transparency
The commissioned paper. According to an investigation by Der Spiegel of 14 April 2026, EnBW’s chief lobbyist sent the responsible head of department a paper with five proposals for the tender on 13 January 2026, two days before the agreement with Brussels. They would have put battery storage at a disadvantage against gas-fired plants. EnBW confirmed in writing that the paper had been written “at the request of the ministry”. The ministry did not deny this despite repeated enquiries. Similar proposals came from RWE at the ministry’s request. EnBW entered the matter in the lobby register only after Der Spiegel’s enquiry. The ministry stated that it carries out “no systematic check” of whether registration duties are met. Whether the proposals found their way into the draft law has not been established.
Seefeld. From 2 to 5 October 2025 Reiche attended the closed-door meeting “Moving MountAIns” in Seefeld, Tyrol, organised among others by Sebastian Kurz and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, her partner. The Greek defence minister attended in his official capacity. The ministry treated Reiche’s attendance as private but, by its own account, made no classification. On 14 January 2026 she had to answer questions about it in the Bundestag’s economic affairs committee.
New York. On 13 October 2025 Reiche met the manager of the financial investor Apollo Global Management in a hotel restaurant on Fifth Avenue. According to the ministry, the talks concerned the “ramp-up of the security and defence industry”. The 63 pages of documents the ministry had to release under the Freedom of Information Act are partly heavily redacted, including the investor’s concrete proposals. Apollo is not entered in the German lobby register.
Houston. From 23 to 25 March 2026 Reiche travelled to CERAWeek in Houston. According to the briefing documents obtained by Deutsche Umwelthilfe and FragDenStaat, she was to stress to Exxon Mobil the interest of German companies in long-term supply contracts for American liquefied natural gas. The answer to the information request came only on 21 July 2026. Deutsche Umwelthilfe is suing for the release of further documents.
Fees. In August 2025 the ministry announced fees of up to 4,000 euros for documents on eight lobby meetings of the minister, by splitting one request from abgeordnetenwatch into eight. The Federal Administrative Court had ruled deterrent fees unlawful in 2016. After a lawsuit was announced, the ministry released the documents in December 2025 for the maximum fee of 500 euros.
Answers to parliament. In reply to the Greens’ question about meetings with the gas industry, the ministry named only two meetings of the minister with the industry association BDEW and stated that there is no obligation to record all contacts. The Erlangen constitutional lawyer Bernhard Wegener commented: “Katherina Reiche’s economics ministry systematically evades answers” (Correctiv, 24 September 2026).
Open questions
Which proposals from EnBW and RWE found their way into the draft law on the power plant strategy, and were providers of battery storage asked for proposals in the same way?
What exactly was discussed with Apollo in New York? The documents are redacted at the decisive points.
How does the ministry decide questions that directly affect the business of E.ON and Westenergie when there are no special rules and no recusal of the minister from such decisions?
Why does the ministry not fully document contacts with interest representatives, when it cites missing records in reply to questions?
And for the time after office: will the statutory cooling-off period be applied in full if she moves into the energy industry?
Methodological note
This profile is based on publicly accessible, verifiable sources. Where a statement comes from one side only, this is indicated. It will be updated when new facts come on record. Her private life is not the subject of the profile. Her relationship with Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg is publicly known and is mentioned only because he co-organised the meeting in Seefeld.
Further reading: Transparency Council concept paper · Transparency Council: Profiles of European Leading Politicians · The Treasure or the Final Sweep-Out · The People Have Become a Nuisance