Breakfast Is Over
Or how the peace dividend was eaten up
After 1990 Germany did not just shrink its army. It rebuilt the whole country as if eternal peace had broken out. Bunkers, sirens, networks and gas storage were set up for fair weather. Now breakfast is over, and the bill is coming.
I. Windows in the bunker
In the Hintere Bleiweißstraße in Nuremberg stands a Second World War high-rise bunker. Its walls were cast to protect people from bombs. Since early 2018 it has been an after-school centre for 87 children. Windows and doors were cut into the concrete, and on top there is a loft flat. The city presented the conversion at the Nuremberg Architecture Prize.
The conversion was sensible. Nuremberg lacked childcare places, the bunker stood empty, and nobody expected it ever to be needed again. That is exactly the point. The Bleiweiß bunker is not a scandal. It is a monument to an assumption that nobody questioned for three decades: there is no more war in Europe.
II. What the peace dividend was
In the early 1980s the Federal Republic spent just under three percent of its economic output on defence. In 1992 the share fell below two percent; in 2014, according to the peace research institute SIPRI, it stood at 1.15 percent. The German Economic Institute calculated what that means compared with the 1990 level: a peace dividend of more than 400 billion dollars.
We have told the military side of this story in “The Apparatus”, “Die Verteidigungsfalle” and “Das Sonder(un)vermögen” (both in German). This is about the other half: the civilian country. For the peace dividend was not cashed in only in the barracks. It was cashed in wherever preparedness costs money and yields no visible return.
The decision to spend less on defence was right in 1990. What was wrong was something else: capabilities were not mothballed but torn down. What is mothballed can be brought back into service within months. What is torn down takes a generation.
III. The bunkers
By the end of the Cold War, West Germany had about 2,000 public shelters with around 1.6 million places. From 2004 they were no longer used, serviced or maintained. In 2007 the federal government and the states decided to abandon the shelter concept altogether. By January 2019, 1,035 public shelters had been released from civil protection use.
Today the Federal Agency for Real Estate still counts 579 public shelters with about 478,000 places, for 84 million people. None of them is functional or ready for use. In Baden-Württemberg there were 547 public shelters with more than 400,000 places during the Cold War. 220 remain, with around 176,000 places, and none of them is usable.
In March 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the dismantling was halted. Even so, the state is not building new bunkers. Interior Minister Dobrindt is relying instead on underground car parks, subway stations and basements that are to be findable via an app. Building new public shelters, experts say, would take “a whole generation”.
One can object that bunkers are of little use against modern missiles with a few minutes’ warning time. The Federal Office for Civil Protection says so too. But then something else should have been put in their place in 2007. Nothing was.
IV. Switzerland and Finland
Two neighbours, neither of them richer than Germany, show that it can be done differently.
In Switzerland, a regulation came into force on 4 October 1963 that every new residential building must have a shelter. Today there are around nine million shelter places there, more than inhabitants. The goal from the 1960s, “a shelter place near their home for every inhabitant”, still applies. Anyone who builds without a shelter pays the municipality a substitute contribution, which finances public shelters. The shelters must be ready for operation within five days. Since 2023 a programme has been under way to secure their upkeep for decades to come. The Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection gives a reason that nobody in Germany dared to utter for thirty years: one must always assume that the situation may one day deteriorate and that an armed conflict cannot be ruled out.
Finland has required shelters to be built under residential and office buildings since the 1950s. The country has around 50,500 shelters with room for about 4.8 million of its 5.6 million inhabitants. Helsinki has more places than inhabitants.
The real difference, however, lies not in the numbers but in how the shelters are used. Beneath Helsinki lies the Merihaka shelter with room for 6,000 people. In everyday life it is a playground with ball courts and a gym. The underground swimming pool at Itäkeskus can be drained within 72 hours and turned into a shelter for 3,800 people. An official at the Finnish interior ministry says the shelters are in very good condition because people use them in normal times.
So Finland used its shelters without giving them up. Germany gave them up in order to use them. Children play in the Bleiweiß bunker today. They do in Merihaka too. The difference is that in Merihaka the doors can still be closed.
Germany, by estimates, has shelters for about three percent of its population.
V. The sirens
After 1990 most sirens were dismantled. In the district of Bad Kissingen this happened in 1992 or 1993. Nobody knows exactly how many there are in Germany today, because the municipalities are responsible.
On 10 September 2020 Germany held its first nationwide alarm test. The warning day became a fiasco: many people received no warning, and in many places not a single siren sounded. The president of the Federal Office for Civil Protection had to go. Ten months later came the flood in the Ahr valley.
The federal government then set up a funding programme of just under 90 million euros, enough for about 5,000 sirens. According to the Federal Office itself, that is not enough for nationwide coverage.
VI. Civil protection as a whole
The dismantling was no accident; it was a programme. As early as 1996 the federal government reported that more than 1,000 civil protection posts had been cut at federal and state level since 1992. The Federal Association for Self-Protection, which was supposed to prepare the population for emergencies, was dissolved at the end of 1996.
In 2016 the federal government admitted in its draft of a new concept that the supply of medicines to the population in a crisis or disaster was not adequately secured. The response was to advise citizens to lay in supplies themselves.
Since May 2026 there has been a “Pact for Civil Protection”: ten billion euros until 2029, new vehicles, 110,000 camp beds and a “Civil Defence Command”. That is much more than before. But the president of the German County Association did the arithmetic: well over 500 billion euros are planned for military defence over the same period, fifty times as much. What use is a strong army if the people it is supposed to protect are neither warned nor sheltered when the first air raid comes?
VII. The gas
In 2020 about 55 percent of German gas imports came from Russia. In 2007 it had been 43 percent. So the dependence grew precisely in the years in which Russia attacked Georgia and annexed Crimea.
On top of that came something one could not make up. Germany’s largest gas storage facility, at Rehden, which accounts for about a fifth of German storage capacity, belonged to the Russian state company Gazprom. Gazprom had barely filled it since the summer of 2021. Even before the war began it was unusually empty. Gazprom had obtained the facility in an asset swap with Wintershall: the German company received stakes in a Siberian gas field, the Russian company control of German gas storage.
The security of supply of an industrial country thus lay in the hands of the supplier on which it depended. No federal government intervened until the war began. Only then did the Federal Network Agency place Gazprom Germania under trusteeship.
VIII. The networks
On 24 February 2022, the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the KA-SAT satellite network failed in Europe. As a side effect, 5,800 Enercon wind turbines with more than ten gigawatts of capacity could no longer be monitored and controlled remotely. Enercon conceded that many wind farms had no backup connection. It took around two months to bring almost all of them back online.
On 8 October 2022 unknown persons cut cables of the railway radio system in Berlin and in Herne. Long-distance rail traffic in northern Germany stood still for almost three hours. One cable was the backup for the other. The association of freight railways wondered why a failure of the train radio was not safeguarded. Two suspects were later identified who, according to the federal government, belonged to no extremist group. That makes matters not better but worse: two people without an extremist background were enough to paralyse the north.
In the Baltic Sea in December 2024 the tanker “Eagle S”, counted as part of Russia’s shadow fleet, dragged its anchor for around a hundred kilometres and severed five lines on the seabed, one power cable and four data cables. Among them was the C-Lion data cable between Helsinki and Rostock, which had been repaired only a month earlier after being damaged in November. Nobody was held to account.
And in the German 5G network, according to an analysis by the consultancy Strand Consult, around 60 percent of the equipment came from Huawei in 2022. Only in July 2024 did the federal government agree with the network operators that the core network should be free of critical Chinese components by the end of 2026, and the access network only by the end of 2029. Deutsche Telekom considered even the 2026 deadline unrealistic.
The 2025 situation report of the Federal Office for Information Security says there is “no reason to sound the all-clear”. The situation remains tense, it says, because protective measures are poorly implemented and digital systems therefore remain vulnerable.
IX. The outsourced brain
How the state dismantled its technical knowledge and replaced it with consultants we described in “Der entkernte Staat” (in German). One question remained open there: who actually checks whether the consultants can do what they sell?
The answer is in the contracts. At federal level, the Procurement Office of the Interior Ministry tenders framework contracts for IT, process, strategy and organisational consulting, from which the authorities then call off services. Each framework contract contains consultant profiles with price levels. At the tender stage, what is checked is whether the firm can show references and whether the CVs of the people offered match the profiles. A framework contract published by the platform FragDenStaat states that consultants may only be deployed with the prior written consent of the requesting authority, and that their suitability must be demonstrated to it in writing.
The requesting authority is the one that brings in the consultant because it lacks the knowledge itself. It is thus supposed to judge the suitability of people whose work it can no longer judge. For IT projects the federal government has solved this problem in its own way: there are separate framework contracts for consulting on quality assurance in IT projects. The quality of consultants is assured by consultants.
What comes of it is established by the Federal Court of Audit when it is too late. Consulting contracts regularly lacked a demonstrated need and a concrete objective. The same firms were commissioned again and again over years. One department had a consulting firm write its rules of procedure, for 765,000 euros. After the criticism in 2024, spending on consultants did not fall but kept rising.
How things work in practice was shown by the parliamentary inquiry into the Bundeswehr consultancy affair. A general testified that he had never given procurement law a thought; others were responsible for that. One contract ran through a company that provided no service itself and passed on the actual consultant’s invoices with a mark-up. The Bundeswehr drew no personnel consequences.
At the same time the state lost the people who could have supervised consultants. According to calculations by the German Institute for Economic Research, municipal building and planning offices cut considerably more than a third of their staff over 25 years. In 2026 the German Economic Institute titled a report “Municipality seeks civil engineer”. The ratio in the Bundestag is clear too: around 150 members studied law, while according to the Bundestag’s own master data 28 state an engineering profession. For every engineer there are more than five lawyers.
Our conclusion: the competence of consultants is checked at the door, not on the work, and by people who can no longer judge the work. With every contract placed outside, the in-house organisation loses a piece of experience. The gap does not close; it grows.
X. Why nobody acted
There were warnings enough. The Federal Office for Information Security publishes a situation report every year, and the federal government itself stated in 2016 that the supply of medicines in an emergency was not secured. The warnings were heard. Nothing was done. We see three reasons for this. They are our conclusion from what is documented above.
Preparedness has no visible return. When it works, nothing happens. Whoever is responsible for a budget can show the expenditure but not the success. Selling a bunker brings money into the till and an after-school centre into the neighbourhood. Keeping a bunker brings nothing but costs. In each individual budget year, dismantling was the sensible decision. Only over the sum of thirty years was it wrong.
Those who decide rarely understand the technology. That a backup cable is only useful if it cannot be reached with the same move as the main cable is something an engineer sees at once. Whether a lawyer sees it is a matter of luck. How the lawyers’ monopoly of the Empire lives on to this day we showed in “The Right Stable Scent”. Those who cannot judge risks themselves rely on consultants, and federal spending on outside consultants rose by 39 percent from 2020 to 2023.
Nobody is liable. When a system fails, it was a service provider, an update, a router or an anchor. Whoever gave up the bunkers in 2007, whoever left the storage facility to Gazprom, whoever let Huawei into the network, answers to nobody for it today. The standard by which all this was right we described in “The General Measure”: whatever preserves the institution in the current year is right.
XI. The bill
Since 2022 things have been moving. The dismantling of bunkers has stopped, sirens are being built again, Huawei has to leave the network, the Rehden storage facility is under state control, and there are ten billion euros for civil protection. That is more than happened in the thirty years before.
But it is the beginning of a bill whose amount nobody knows. What was dismantled over thirty years will not be rebuilt in five, and the money saved back then has long been spent. The Bleiweiß bunker will remain an after-school centre. That is as it should be. But one should say honestly what it is today: no longer a shelter, but proof of how thoroughly the emergency was abolished.
Breakfast is over. Nobody has paid for it yet.
Further reading: The Apparatus · The Borrowed Sovereignty · The Right Stable Scent · Der entkernte Staat · Die Verteidigungsfalle · Das Sonder(un)vermögen (German)